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The Expansion of “Particularly Serious Crimes” in Refugee Law:  
Mirroring the Severity Revolution 
 
Mary Holper∗ 
 
 Refugees are not protected from deportation if they have been convicted of a 
“particularly serious crime” (“PSC”) which renders them a danger to the community.  This raises 
questions about the meaning of “particularly serious” and “danger to the community.”  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals, Attorney General, and Congress have interpreted PSC quite 
broadly, leaving many refugees vulnerable to deportation without any consideration of the risk of 
persecution in their cases.  This trend is disturbing as a matter of refugee law, but it is even more 
disturbing because it demonstrates how certain criminal law trends have played out in 
immigration law.  This article offers an explanation for the PSC expansion and proposes a 
definition that includes only violent crimes, i.e., those involving actual or threatened physical 
injury to a person, where the noncitizen served a significant sentence.  While there has been 
much scholarship on the convergence of criminal and immigration law1 (dubbed 
“crimmigration”)2  and on refugee protection,3 there has been surprisingly little written about the 
PSC bar to refugee protection,4 where crimmigration law meets refugee law.   This article seeks 
to fill that gap in the literature. 
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1 See, e.g., Social Control and Justice: Crimmigration in the Age of Fear (Maria João Guia et al, eds. 2013); César 
Cuauhtémoc Garcia Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457 (2013); Ingrid Eagly, 
Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010); Stephen Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Jennifer Chacón, 
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control, and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 
(2007); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 
(2006); Theresa Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L. J. 81 (2005); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th 
“Pale of Law,” 29 N. C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Theresa Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent 
Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 661 (2003); Nora Demleitner, Immigration 
Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?  51 EMORY L. J. 1059 (2002); 
Daniel Kanstroom: Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts about Why Hard Cases Make Bad 
Laws, 113 HARV. L REV. 1889 (2000); Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer 
Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669 (1997). 
2 See See Stumpf, supra note 1, at 369. 
3 See, e.g., Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377 (2014); Deborah Anker, Lauren Gilbert & 
Nancy Kelly, Women Whose Governments Are Unable or Unwilling To Provide Reasonable Protection from 
Domestic Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 741-43 
(1997); Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1179, 1195 (1994); David A Martin, The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the 
Careful Use of a Scarce Resource, Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States 30-51 (H. Adelman ed. 1991). 
4 See David Delgado, Running Afoul of the Non-Refoulement Principle: The [Mis]Interpretation and 
[Mis]Application of the Particularly Serious Crime Exception, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1 (2013) (criticizing 
as contrary to Congressional intent and other countries’ interpretations of the Refugee Convention the Board’s 
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This article proposes two theories for the ever-broadening PSC definition.  First is what 
this article terms the “mistrusting criminal judges effect:” Attorney General Ashcroft and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) eliminated the criminal sentence as a relevant factor 
from the test set forth in the 1982 seminal case on PSC, Matter of Frentescu;5 this is part of an 
increasing mistrust of criminal court judges in immigration law.  Second is what this article 
terms “the sweeping effect:” the expansive reading of the PSC bar is part of a larger trend by the 
Board and Congress to sweep many offenses into a “crimmigration” term of art6 in order to 
render more noncitizens deportable and fewer eligible for relief from removal.  These PSC trends 
mirror a trend occurring within the criminal justice system; namely, the “severity revolution” of 
the 1980’s and 90’s, where attention shifted away from rehabilitating the individual offender and 
toward minimizing the risks presented by certain classes of offenders.7  The severity revolution, 
which was reflected in immigration law during the 1990’s and 2000’s,8 allowed “tough on 
crime” mentality to outweigh the humanitarian aspects of the 1980 Refugee Act, where the term 
PSC first was introduced into U.S. immigration law.  This article seeks to expose these troubling 
trends in PSC law and proposes that the term include only violent crimes against persons where 
the offender has served a significant sentence.     
 Part I of the article describes the history of the PSC bar, which is taken from the 1951 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Protocol”), to which the U.S. 
acceded in 1968.  Part I also discusses the various U.S. statutes implementing this bar to 
protection under refugee law and foundational Board cases interpreting the PSC bar.  Part II 
describes key cases interpreting the PSC bar through the lens of violence, beginning with a 
proposed definition of “violent crime” that includes actual or threatened physical injury to a 
person.  Part II describes how in the early days of interpreting PSC, primarily violent offenses 
were found to be PSCs.  Part II then discusses the case of drug trafficking, which laid the 
foundation for non-violent crimes as PSCs, and discusses today’s landscape, where possession of 
child pornography and financial crimes also are PSCs.  In Part III, the article lays out two 
theories for why non-violent crimes have become PSCs.  First is the mistrusting sentencing 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
holdings that non-aggravated felonies can be considered PSCs on a case-by-case basis and that there should be no 
separate determination of dangerousness once a judge has concluded that the noncitizen has been convicted of a 
PSC); Michael McGarry, A Statute in Serious Need of Reinterpretation: The Particularly Serious Crime Exception 
to Removal, 51 B.C.L. REV. 209, 230-40 (2010) (arguing that courts must honor the intent of the Protocol and 
Congress by applying a more restrictive understanding of the particularly serious crimes exception and find that an 
individual poses a continuing danger to the community before they may deny him protection under withholding of 
removal provisions). 
5 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982) (when determining whether a crime is a PSC, requiring the judge to consider 
“[1] the nature of the conviction, [2] the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, [3] the type of 
sentence imposed, and, most importantly, [4] whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien 
will be a danger to the community.”). 
6 Juliet Stumpf, who coined the term “crimmigration,” defines this phenomenon as the criminalization of 
immigration law through dramatic increases in criminal consequences of immigration law violations and 
deportations of many for crimes.  See Stumpf, supra note 1, at 369.  This article uses the term to describe crime-
related immigration terms of art that carry significant immigration consequences; examples are “aggravated felony,” 
“crime involving moral turpitude,” and “particularly serious crime.”  
7 See Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America’s Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
217, 219 (2001); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern 
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 829, 832 (2000). 
8 Miller, Blurring Boundaries, supra note 1, at 83; Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 1, at 618-20. 
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judges effect; the Attorney General’s 2002 decision in Matter of Y-L-9 introduced this trend into 
PSC law and the Board’s 2007 Matter of N-A-M-10 decision cemented it.  This part also 
discusses other areas of immigration law in which little to no deference is given to a criminal 
judge’s decision: for example, many state court vacaturs of guilty pleas are not recognized for 
immigration purposes, immigration judges are instructed to give little weight to a criminal 
judge’s bail decision when deciding an immigration bond, Congress eliminated the Judicial 
Recommendation Against Deportation, and Congress changed the immigration definitions of 
“conviction,” “sentence,” and “term of imprisonment” to give less weight to criminal judges’ 
decisions.  The other theory described is the sweeping effect, the tendency of the Board, 
Attorney General, and Congress to sweep as many crimes as possible into “crimmigration” terms 
of art like “particularly serious crime,” “aggravated felony,” and “crime involving moral 
turpitude,” stretching these vague terms beyond recognition.  Part IV links the PSC evolution to 
the severity revolution of criminal law and examines the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which was 
born out of the severity revolution, as a case study in dangerousness to draw lessons in the PSC 
context.  Finally, this part examines the lessons learned from this era of harsh criminal law and 
argues that refugee law should not repeat such trends.  In Part V, the article proposes that 
Congress redefine PSC to include only violent offenses against persons where the noncitizen 
served a significant sentence; alternatively, the Board or Attorney General could adopt such a 
test for cases falling within their discretion.   
 
 
I. The PSC Bar in Context 
 
This section describes the history of the PSC bar, including its international law origins.  
The section begins with an overview of asylum and withholding of removal, the types of relief 
available to a refugee in U.S. law that are barred due to a PSC conviction.11 
                                                            
9 Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, & R-S-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002). 
10 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007). 
11 Even if barred from protection under the Refugee Convention due to a crime, a noncitizen who fears torture, may 
seek relief under Article 3 of United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, which the United States ratified in 1994 and adopted into U.S. law through the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, Div. G, Tit. XXII, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).  
Article 3 protects a noncitizen from removal to a country “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture,” regardless of the crimes that subjected her to removal.  Torture 
Convention, art. 3, para. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 114; 8 C.F.R. § 208.17.  In U.S. law, this relief remains quite limited, 
as the Board has chosen to narrowly interpret the meaning of “torture” under the Convention.  See Torture 
Convention, art. 1, ¶1, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (defining torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”); see also Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing 
of Victim Protection Under Article Three of the Convention Against Torture, 88 OR. L. REV. 777, 779 (2009) 
(arguing that the Board’s narrow interpretation of “specific intent” impermissibly shifts the focus off protecting the 
victim and onto the alleged torturer’s acts); Lori A. Nessel, Willful Blindness" to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: 
United States' Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
71, 80 (2004) (arguing that in order to provide meaningful protection from gender-based torture, the term 
“acquiescence” must be interpreted to include a state's failure to prosecute or to protect against torture by nonstate 
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a. Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
 
A noncitizen who fears persecution in her home country may obtain protection under 
U.S. immigration laws by requesting asylum or withholding of removal.  These means of 
requesting protection from the U.S. government stem from international protective principles for 
refugees that emerged between the two World Wars and took hold following World War II.12 
Refugee protections were codified in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol, 
to which the U.S. acceded in 1968.  By signing the Protocol, the United States became bound by 
articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention.13  The concept of nonrefoulement, or 
nonreturn,  appears in Article 33.1 of the Convention, which states that “no contracting state 
shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion.”14   
Nonrefoulement first was implemented in U.S. law in 1950, and in 1952 came to be 
called withholding of deportation.15  In 1996, when “removal” replaced “deportation” as the 
official term describing the explusion of a noncitizen from the U.S.,16 withholding of deportation 
became withholding of removal.17 Withholding is a mandatory form of relief from removal.18  If 
the noncitizen can prove that what she fears amounts to persecution,19 that it is more likely than 
not to happen,20 and that it will occur on account of one of the five protected grounds, she should 
be granted withholding, regardless of her desirability as a member of the U.S. community.  
Importantly, though, withholding is “country-specific,” which means that an applicant could be 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
actors). While a full discussion of the Torture Convention is outside of the scope of this article, it is important to 
note that it exists as one additional protective mechanism beyond asylum and withholding and is available to those 
who are barred from such relief because of a PSC. 
12 See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law 119 (2d ed. 1996). 
13 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6278, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968). 
14 Refugee Convention Article 33.1. 
15 See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 812-13 (7th ed. 2012) 
(discussing Internal Security Act of 1950, Ch. 1024 § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010, which exempted noncitizens from 
deportation “to any country in which the Attorney General shall find that such alien would be subjected to physical 
persecution”); see also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243, 66 Stat. 212 (enacting 
former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)) (first naming “withholding of deportation,” which authorized the Attorney General “to 
withhold deportation to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution and 
for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.”). 
16 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) § 304, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 
(enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (3) and (e)(2)). 
17 Congress also moved the nonrefoulement provision to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), where it had formerly been in 8 
U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B).  IIRIRA §§ 305, 308. 
18 See former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)).  In the early days, the nonrefoulement provision 
was discretionary.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Aleinikoff et al, supra note 15, at 813.  The 
U.S. acceded to the substantive portions of the Refugee Convention, in particular Article 33, in 1967, so thereafter 
nonrefoulement was not discretionary.  See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423-24.  To bring the U.S. in line with its 
treaty obligations, the U.S. made withholding mandatory by statute with the Refugee Act in 1980.  See id.; see also 
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 §203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980). 
19 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (defining persecution as a “threat to life or freedom of, or the 
infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive”). 
20 See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). 
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deported to a third country where she will not face persecution.21  Also, someone who has been 
granted withholding is not given full membership rights in the United States, as she may not 
apply for permanent residency, petition for family to join her in the U.S., or travel outside the 
U.S.  In effect, she lives under an order of removal, but with permission to stay because the 
removal may not be effectuated to the country of persecution (assuming no other country will 
accept her).22   
Asylum did not exist in U.S. law until 1980, when Congress passed the Refugee Act, 
which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).23  Congress maintained 
withholding of deportation, yet introduced asylum, which in some respects is very similar to 
withholding.  In order to be granted asylum, an applicant must prove fear or persecution on 
account of one of the five protected grounds.24  The likelihood of persecution need not be as high 
– the Supreme Court has said an asylum applicant must only show a “well-founded” fear, which 
translates to a 10% likelihood that persecution will occur, whereas a withholding applicant must 
show a 51% likelihood that persecution will occur.25  Should a noncitizen prevail in a request for 
asylum, unlike withholding, she may apply to become a permanent resident of the U.S. and later 
a U.S. citizen.26  Asylum, however, is discretionary; a judge can refuse asylum, even though an 
applicant has met all of the requirements, if the judge believes she is undesirable as a member of 
the U.S. community.27  In such a circumstance, a judge would then consider the same applicant’s 
circumstances for a grant of withholding.  In contrast to withholding, which implements Article 
33.1 of the Refugee Convention, the Supreme Court has described asylum as the U.S. 
implementation of Article 34 of the Convention,28 which states that contracting states “shall as 
far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.”29     
 
b. PSC as a Bar to Nonrefoulement 
 
The drafters of the Refugee Convention at first considered the principle of 
nonrefoulement to be so fundamental that there should be no exception.30  Including any 
exception was quite controversial, as it meant a signatory country would be allowed to send 
someone back to the arms of her persecutors.31  In fact, the Refugee Convention’s U.S. delegate 
suggested “it would be highly undesirable to suggest in the text of that article that there might be 
cases, even highly exceptional cases, where a man might be sent to death or persecution.”32  
However, the drafters ultimately recognized that national security could trump the 
nonrefoulement principle, and that some countries may not ratify the Refugee Convention if 
                                                            
21 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428 n.6 (quoting Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (1982)). 
22 See Matter of I-S- & C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 433 (BIA 2008). 
23 Pub. L. No. 96-212, Title II, 94 Stat 102 (1980). 
24 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1101(a)(42)(A). 
25 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431, 440, 449. 
26 See 8 U.S.C. § 1159. 
27 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424. 
28 See id. at 441. 
29 Refugee Convention Article 34. 
30 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 12, at 119-20. 
31 See Paul Weis: The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed With a Commentary by Dr. 
Paul Weis 326-36 (Paul Weis ed., 1995). 
32 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Second Session, UN Doc. E/1850; 
E/AC.32/8 ¶ 30 (Aug. 25, 1950).   
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there was no exception for dangerous individuals.33  The drafters thus opted to include certain 
bars to protection in the form of nonrefoulement: serious nonpolitical crime, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,34 
and PSC.35  Although they sound similar, the serious nonpolitical crime bars an applicant who 
has committed some offense outside of the country where she is seeking refuge; the PSC bar 
pertains to offenses committed for which there has been a conviction in the country of refuge.36 
After describing who qualifies for nonrefoulement in Article 33.1 of the Refugee 
Convention, Article 33.2 immediately qualifies that benefit, stating:  
 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in 
which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.37 
 
 The Convention does not define PSC.  Leading international refugee law experts have 
commented that it is only justified in the most exceptional of circumstances and should include 
crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery, and arson.38  The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), in its Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status,39 states that the exception is reserved for “extreme cases.”40  The 
UNHCR Handbook goes into more detail about how to define a “serious nonpolitical crime;”41 it 
defines such a crime as a “capital crime or a very grave punishable act.”42 
 
c. U.S. Statutory Implementation of the PSC Bar 
 
The 1980 Refugee Act and each subsequent amendment to the withholding statutes 
contained the PSC bar; it was not until 1996 that PSC became a bar to asylum.43  When 
originally enacted, the PSC bar applied to an individual who “having been convicted by a final 
                                                            
33 Weis, supra note 31, at 326-36. 
34 Refugee Convention Art. 1(F). 
35 Refugee Convention Art. 33(2). 
36 UNHCR Handbook, ¶¶153-154. 
37 Refugee Convention Art. 33(2). 
38 Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in 
Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection 139, ¶ 186 
(Erika Feller, Volker Turk & Frances Nicholson, eds., 2003); Weis, supra note 31, at 342; Atle Grahl-Madsen, 
Commentary on the Refugee Convention, Division of International Protection of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (1963) ¶ 9. 
39 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, ¶ 155, 
U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) (“UNHCR Handbook”), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html. 
40 Id. at ¶154. 
41 See id. at ¶¶155-161.  
42 Handbook ¶155; see also id. (“Minor offences punishable by moderate sentences are not grounds for exclusion 
under Article 1 F (b) even if technically referred to as ‘crimes’ in the penal law of the country concerned.”). 
43 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107.  Although PSC was not a bar to asylum 
until 1996, the Immigration Act of 1990 provided that a noncitizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony 
“may not apply for or be granted asylum.”  Immigration Act of 1990 § 515(b)(1), 104 Stat. at 5053, as corrected by 
the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232 105 
Stat. 1733, 1752 (enacted Dec. 12, 1991). 
7 
 
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United 
States.”44  This language replicated the PSC bar in the Refugee Convention, since “Congress’ 
primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with [the 
Protocol.]”45   
In subsequent changes made to the withholding of removal statute, Congress began to 
give some meaning to PSC by reference to another term of art in immigration law, “aggravated 
felony.”  In 1990, Congress amended the statute to make aggravated felonies categorically 
PSCs.46  However, in 1990, there were only a small number of crimes that were considered 
aggravated felonies.47  Over the course of several pieces of legislation in the 1990’s, Congress 
expanded the definition of what was considered an aggravated felony.48  To ensure compliance 
with the Protocol, with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),49 
Congress amended the PSC exception to allow the Attorney General to override the categorical 
determination that all aggravated felonies were PSCs when “necessary to ensure compliance with 
the 1967 [Refugee Protocol].”50     
The AEDPA version of the statute was only on the books for a few short months before 
the current version of the withholding statute was passed in 1996 with the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”).51  The statute reads: “Subparagraph (A) 
[providing for withholding of removal] does not apply…if the Attorney general decides 
that…the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a 
danger to the community of the United States.”52  This version of the statute eliminated the 
categorical bar for aggravated felonies.53  In IIRIRA, Congress again expanded the definition of 
aggravated felony, “primarily by reducing from five years to one the minimum penalty necessary 
for several offenses to qualify as aggravated felonies.”54  Congress then changed the categorical 
PSC exception to only include aggravated felony convictions with at least five-year sentences.55  
In another provision, Congress clarified that such sentence did not refer to time served, but 
                                                            
44 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1981). 
45 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37.   
46 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–649, § 515(a)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5053.   
47 At the time, murder, drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, and attempts or conspiracies to commit those crimes 
were the only offenses worthy of the “aggravated felony” classification.  See Anti-Drug Abuse At of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). 
48 See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text. 
49 Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996).   
50 AEDPA § 415(f), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat 1214.  The Board, in Matter of Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639 
(BIA 1996), established a test to implement AEDPA § 415(f)’s mandate to conduct a discretionary analysis to 
ensure compliance with the Refugee Protocol.  Aggravated felonies with sentences of at least five years would be 
PSCs, with no further inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the case.  See id. at 653.  Aggravated felonies with 
sentences of fewer than five years, however, would presumptively be PSCs, but that presumption could be overcome 
if “there is any unusual aspect of the alien’s particular aggravated felony that convincingly evidences that his or her 
crime cannot rationally be deemed ‘particularly serious’ in light of our treaty obligations under the Protocol.”  Id. at 
654. 
51 Pub. L. 104–208, § 305(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546.  IIRIRA was passed on September 30, 1996, and became effective 
on April 1, 1997. 
52 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). 
53 Id.   
54 See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2013). 
55 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); IIRIRA § 305(a). 
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included any amount of the sentence that was suspended.56  For asylum, Congress deemed all 
aggravated felonies to be PSCs.57 
 
d. Foundational Board Cases Interpreting PSC 
 
Following the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the meaning of PSC was an important 
unresolved question for the Board to decide.  In 1982, the Board decided Matter of Frentescu, 
which became the seminal case on the meaning of PSC.58 In Frentescu, the Board recognized 
that it was operating on a clean slate.  The Refugee Act, Protocol, and UNHCR Handbook all 
had little to say about the meaning of the term.59  From the statutory language, the Board 
determined that a “ ‘particularly serious crime’ is more serious than a ‘serious nonpolitical 
crime,’ although many crimes may be classified [as both].”60  The UNHCR Handbook also 
instructed that the PSC bar was for “extreme cases.”61  The Board also rejected arguments that 
PSC is synonymous with “crime involving moral turpitude,” another term of art in immigration 
law with a long history of Board case law interpreting its meaning.62  
In order to guide immigration judges in their PSC determinations, the Board set forth a 
test.  There are two parts to the Frentescu test: first, the judge must determine whether the crime 
“on its face” is a PSC.63  If the crime is not inherently particularly serious, the record should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.64  For the case-by-case determinations, the Board articulated 
four factors that are relevant to the determination of whether a crime is a PSC: “[1] the nature of 
the conviction, [2] the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, [3] the type of 
sentence imposed, and, most importantly, [4] whether the type and circumstances of the crime 
indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.”65  The Board continuously revived the 
Frentescu test with each statutory change to the PSC bar.66  The test became imbedded in PSC 
                                                            
56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B); IIRIRA § 322. 
57 IIRIRA § 604. 
58 See 18 I. & N. Dec. 247; Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1038. 
59 See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 246. 
60 Id. at 245, 247. 
61 Id. at 246 (quoting UNHCR Handbook ¶154). 
62 Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 246 n. 7; see generally Mary Holper, Deportation for A Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is 
Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647 (2012) (discussing history of CIMT). 
63 Frentescu, 18 I & N. Dec. at 247.  The Board later decided that first degree burglary, which involves burglary of a 
residence and aggravating circumstances such as being armed with a deadly weapon, displaying a weapon, 
threatening with a weapon, or causing injury, was a per se PSC.  See Matter of Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
423, 425-26 (BIA 1986); see also Matter of Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (BIA 1986) (holding that armed 
robbery involving the use of a firearm on its face is a PSC); Gjonaj v. INS, 47 F.3d 824, 826 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that assault with a firearm with intent to murder is so serious that no factual inquiry into individual circumstances is 
necessary); Ahmetovic, 62 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that first degree manslaughter was inherently 
particularly serious). 
64 Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. 
65 Id.  The Ninth Circuit has described the Frentescu decision as “neither adopt[ing] a precise definition of what 
constitutes a particularly serious crime nor set[ting] forth any comprehensive list of crimes falling within the 
definition.”  See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1039. 
66 See Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 534 n.3 (BIA 1992); Matter of L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649 (BIA 1999) 
(en banc); Matter of S-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 458, 463–65 (BIA 1999) (en banc).  The Board never determine whether 
the Frentescu framework applies to applications decided under AEDPA because the only precedential decision, Q-
T-M-T-, only addressed the standard for those convicted of aggravated felonies.  See Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 
654 
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law to such an extent that some federal courts of appeals, when reviewing PSC determinations, 
determined that the Board abused its discretion by not applying one of the Frentescu factors.67   
 In 1985, the Board decided another important issue – whether the judge should weigh the 
likelihood of persecution against the seriousness of the offense when deciding whether an 
offense is a PSC.  In Matter of Rodriguez-Coto,68 the Board answered this question for both 
PSCs and serious nonpolitical crimes, deciding that the crime determination is a threshold issue.  
The Board reasoned: “[w]e cannot find that the language and framework of [the withholding 
provision] supports such an approach, which would in effect transform a statutory exclusionary 
clause into a discretionary consideration.”69  Thus a finding that a crime was a PSC prevented 
any further inquiry into the merits of a withholding claim.70  The Supreme Court later upheld this 
decision with respect to serious nonpolitical crimes.71  
In the 1986 case Matter of Carballe,72 the Board decided whether there should be a 
separate determination of dangerousness once a noncitizen was found to have been convicted of 
a PSC under the Frentescu test.  The “separate determination of dangerousness” at issue in 
Carballe would be akin to a bond hearing, assessing the applicant’s current dangerousness and 
considering evidence such as remorse and rehabilitation.73  The finding of dangerousness 
imbedded within the Frentescu test, on the other hand, requires looking at the nature and 
circumstances of the crime – essentially freezing the inquiry at the time of conviction – to 
determine whether that crime and those facts indicate that someone will be a danger to the 
community.74  The Board in Carballe found that the statute did not require two separate and 
distinct factual findings of dangerousness.75  The Board stated “those aliens who have been 
convicted of particularly serious crimes are presumptively dangers to the country’s 
community.”76  The Board found, however, that the two clauses were “inextricably related.”77  
The Board reasoned that the separate dangerousness assessment was not necessary because the 
Frentescu test already incorporated such a finding, since the fourth and “most important 
factor”78—danger to the community—is the “essential key” to determining whether a conviction 
                                                            
67 See Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 330 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Because the Board failed to consider the two most 
important Frentescu factors and relied on improper considerations, we conclude that the Board’s decision was 
arbitrary and capricious.”); Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1221 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Estrada-Espinoza 
v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude that the BIA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing 
in its duty to consider the facts and circumstances of Mr. Afridi's conviction.”); cf. Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 
150, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming the decision of the agency because the Board “properly applied its own 
precedent” by “address[ing] each Frentescu factor”). 
68 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 1985). 
69 Id. at 209. 
70 See id. 
71 See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 426 (1999) (“As a matter of plain language, it is not obvious that an 
already-completed crime is somehow rendered less serious by considering the further circumstance that the alien 
may be subject to persecution if returned to his home country.”). 
72 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1986). 
73 See id. at 359-60; cf Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (listing factors an immigration judge 
must consider when determining bond, with one factor being the recency of his criminal activity). 
74 See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247 (listing as one of the four factors “whether the type and circumstances of the 
crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community”). 
75 Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. 
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is particularly serious.79   Every federal court of appeals to have considered Carballe has 
deferred to the decision, with several courts opining that Congress intended no separate 
determination of dangerousness once a crime was a PSC.80   
 
II. From Violent to Non-Violent Crimes 
 
There is growing trend in PSC case law where nonviolent offenses are PSCs.  In the early 
days, primarily violent offenses were PSCs with one exception: drug trafficking.  Categorizing 
drug trafficking as a PSC opened the door to recent cases, where more non-violent offenses such 
as financial crimes and possession of child pornography bar protection.  This section will explore 
this evolution in the PSC case law.  To contextualize the discussion, this section begins with a 
proposed definition of “violent crime.” 
 
a. “Violent Crime” Defined 
 
The law has no settled meaning of “violent crime.”81  Criminal law scholar Alice 
Ristroph has examined a variety of definitions of violent crime in common law and federal 
sentencing laws to demonstrate that violence is a dual concept that describes both a seemingly 
undeniable fact of pain and injury to the body and moral judgements.82  The term “violence,” she 
argues, “becomes an abstraction, and eventually that abstraction may become a repository for all 
we find repulsive, transgressive, or simply sufficiently annoying.”83  She argues that the lack of a 
critical analysis of violence is one of the failures of criminal law, which finds legitimation by 
addressing the problem of violent crime.84  She writes, “[i]f the criminal law does best when 
violence – the old-fashioned, physically harmful kind – is involved, then perhaps the law needs a 
renewed focus on ‘true’ violence.”85 
It is this “true” violent crime – that which involves actual or threatened physical injury – 
that this article proposes as a definition of “violent crime” for the purposes of assessing whether 
an offense is a PSC.86  Although federal sentencing law has definitions such as “crime of 
violence”87 and “violent felony,”88 these definitions suffer from the broadening of the concept of 
                                                            
79 Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360. 
80 See, e.g., Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1995); Al-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390, 393 (10th Cir. 1995); 
Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1993); Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 1993); Martins v. INS, 972 
F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1992); Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271, 275 (11th Cir. 1988); Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 
F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 17 (1979)) (discussing House Judiciary Committee Report, which noted that the PSC exception included 
“aliens…who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes which make them a danger to the community of the 
United States.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Following IIRIRA, a regulation was also enacted to codify the Carballe 
decision.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (“For purposes of section 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act, or section 
243(h)(2)(B) of the Act as it appeared prior to April 1, 1997, an alien who has been convicted of a particularly 
serious crime shall be considered to constitute a danger to the community.”).   
81 Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571 (2011). 
82 Id. at 574-75. 
83 Id. at 575. 
84 Id. at 611-13. 
85 Id. at 618. 
86 See id. at 573, 618. 
87 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining as a “crime of violence” as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or any other offense that is a felony and 
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“violence” that Ristroph describes by expanding the term to include crimes involving the risk of 
injury.89  What is more, the Supreme Court recently held that one prong of the “violent felony” 
definition- a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury 
to another” – is void for vagueness.90  Thus, rather than rely on these Congressional definitions 
of violent crime, this article defines the term by reference to actual or threatened physical injury 
to a person.  In this way, the article uses a violent crime definition that more closely tracks the 
common law “crimes against persons” categories, which reflected societal concerns with 
physical injuries to the human body.91  
 
b. Violent Offenses as PSCs: The Early Days 
 
The Board has never set forth a test whereby only violent crimes could be PSCs; 
however, in its early case law interpreting PSC, primarily violent offenses were found to be 
PSCs.  In Frentescu, the Board stated, “[c]rimes against persons are more likely to be 
categorized as ‘particularly serious crimes.’ Nevertheless, we recognize that there may be 
instances where crimes (or a crime) against property will be considered as such crimes.”92  
Despite leaving the door open to property crimes as PSCs, in Mr. Frentescu’s case, the Board 
held that burglary of a dwelling with intent to commit theft was not a PSC because “there is no 
indication that the dwelling was occupied or that the applicant was armed; nor is there any 
indication of an aggravating circumstance.”93  In Carballe, the Board held that two felony 
convictions for robbery with a firearm were inherently PSCs because they “involved the use of a 
firearm [and]… were felonies, as well as offenses against individuals;”94 thus, “[o]n their face, 
they were dangerous;”95 the Board went further to describe robbery as a “grave, serious, 
aggravated, infamous, and heinous crime.”96  
In most cases subsequent cases, the Board found that violent crimes were PSCs.97  For 
example, robbery by force, violence, or assault was found to be a PSC,98 as was robbery of an 
occupied home while armed with a handgun,99 robbery with deadly weapon,100 armed 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be 
used in the course of committing the offense”). 
88 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (defining “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year ... that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another; or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 
89 See Ristroph, supra note 81, at 574. 
90 Johnson v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). 
91 See Ristroph, supra note 81, at 579-80. 
92 See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. 
93 Id.  
94 Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See Denis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The BIA has consistently stated that crimes 
entailing or threatening to use physical force or violence against another person ‘are more likely to be categorized as 
particularly serious.’”) (citing N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342); L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 649; Matter of L-S-J-, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 973, 974-75 (BIA 1997)). 
98 S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1309 (BIA 2000). 
99 S-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 466–67. 
100 L-S-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 974–75 
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robbery,101 aggravated battery involving a firearm,102 and burglary involving a deadly 
weapon.103  In contrast, the Board held that a conviction for alien smuggling (for commercial 
gain) was not a PSC even though “the act of smuggling can put aliens in significant danger[] 
and…it can also endanger the lives of United States residents.”104  In that case, the Board 
stressed that despite the potential for significant bodily harm – the respondent hid a woman in a 
compartment built underneath the floor of  a van – the “respondent did not, in fact, cause [the 
alien] harm.”105  
 
c. Drug Trafficking as a PSC 
 
Drug trafficking is a non-violent crime that, in being classified as a PSC, became the 
bridge to other non-violent crimes becoming PSCs.  In 1988, the Board held that drug trafficking 
was a PSC, stating, “the harmful effect to society from drug offenses has consistently been 
recognized by Congress in the clear distinctions and disparate treatment it has drawn between 
drug offenses and other crimes.”106  In 1991, the Board found drug trafficking to be a per se 
PSC, citing to both the disparate Congressional treatment of the offense and societal harms of 
drug trafficking.107   
In 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft in Matter of Y-L- created a presumption that drug 
trafficking aggravated felony convictions are PSCs.108  The three noncitizens whose cases were 
considered had been convicted of drug trafficking, which met the definition of aggravated 
felony,109 yet each was sentenced to less than five years and thus did not have a statutory PSC 
for the purposes of withholding.110  The Board had held that they were not barred from 
withholding, yet the Attorney General vacated those decisions, certifying the case to himself.111  
                                                            
101 Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 208. 
102 B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 427, 429 (BIA 1991). 
103 Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 425. 
104 See L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 655.     
105 Id. at 654-56.    
106 Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682, 683-84 (BIA 1988).  To support this proposition, the Board cited 
immigration statutes that rendered deportable someone who had a conviction relating to a controlled substance.  See 
id. at 684 (citing former 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) and (4).  The Board also discussed the refugee waiver, which asylees 
and refugees can use to waive grounds of inadmissibility for humanitarian reasons; Congress prevented noncitizens 
who were inadmissible for drug trafficking from applying for such waiver.  See id. (citing 8 U.S.C.§§ 1157(c)(3) 
and 1159(c), former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23)). 
107 Matter of U-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 327, 330-32 (BIA 1991). The Board stated:  
Illicit narcotic drugs sold in the United States ruin or destroy the lives of many American citizens each 
year. Apart from the considerable number of people in this country who die of overdoses of narcotics or 
who become the victims of homicides related to the unlawful traffic of drugs, many others become disabled 
by addiction to heroin, cocaine, and other drugs. There are also many in this country who suffer crimes 
against their persons and property at the hands of drug addicts and criminals who use the proceeds of their 
crimes to support their drug needs. Additionally, a considerable amount of money is drained from the 
economy of the United States annually because of unlawful trafficking in drugs. This unfortunate situation 
has reached epidemic proportions and it tears the very fabric of American society. 
Id. at 330. 
108 See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 274.   
109 See id. at 271; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (drug trafficking as an aggravated felony). 
110 See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 271. 
111 See id. at 272, 277.  8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1)(i) permits the Attorney General to certify a question to him or herself; 
this practice that has been criticized.  See Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards 
in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766 (2010). 
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AG Ashcroft stated: “the BIA has seen fit to employ a case-by-case approach, applying an 
individualized, and often haphazard, assessment as to the ‘seriousness’ of an alien defendant’s 
crime.  Not surprisingly, this methodology has led to results that are both inconsistent and, as 
plainly evident here, illogical.”112 
To support this presumption, he quoted heavily from the 1991 Board case about the 
societal harms of drug trafficking.113  The Attorney General further cited to the “long-standing 
congressional recognition that drug trafficking felonies justify the harshest of legal 
consequences.”114  For this assertion, he cited to the controlled substances ground of 
deportability,115 various harsh penalties for aggravated felons in the INA (of which drug 
trafficking is a subset),116 and other federal statutes outside of immigration law.117 
What is notable about the Attorney General’s decision is how he justified the 
presumption that drug trafficking is a PSC by reference to not only the societal harms caused by 
drug trafficking, but also the violent nature of the offense.  He stated: 
 
The devastating effects of drug trafficking offenses on the health and general welfare, not 
to mention the national security, of this country are well documented.  Because the illegal 
drug market in the United States is one of the most profitable in the world, it attracts the 
most ruthless, sophisticated, and aggressive traffickers.  Substantial violence is present at 
all levels of the distribution chain.  Indeed, international terrorists increasingly employ 
drug trafficking as one of their primary sources of funding.118 
 
By citing to the violent nature of drug trafficking, he brought this holding in line with the 
many Board cases that had found violent offenses to be PSCs.119  He also listed six criteria that a 
                                                            
112 Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 273. 
113 See supra note 107.   
114 See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 275 (emphasis in original). 
115 See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)). 
116 See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (no judicial review for aggravated felons); see also id. (citing 8 U.S.C. 
1228 (expedited removal for aggravated felons)).  The AG further stated, “[t]the fact that Congress, as part of the 
IIRIRA legislation of 1996, chose to jettison a prior INA ruling treating all aggravated felonies – of which drug 
trafficking felonies are a subset – as per se ‘ particularly serious crime,’ should not be confused with an indication 
that Congress no longer considered drug trafficking crimes in particular, to be as serious and pernicious as it had 
previously viewed them.”  Id. at 275-76. 
117 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(12)) (conviction for serious federal drug offense constitutes aggravated factor 
for purposes of weighing imposition of federal death penalty); see also id. (citing 21 § U.S.C. 862) (convicted drug 
traffickers subject to order of ineligibility for federal benefits). 
118 Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276 (citing Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Target America: 
Traffickers, Terrorists & Your Kids - A National Symposium on Narco-Terrorism (Dec. 4, 2001), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov:80/dea/deamuseum/transcript.doc; Drug Trade and the Terror Network: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 107th Cong. (Oct. 3, 2001) (statement of Asa Hutchinson, Administrator of Drug Enforcement 
Administration), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov:80/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct100301.html; Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, Drug-Related Crime (Fact Sheets, March 2000); Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, A National Report: Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System (Dec. 1992)); see also 
Demleitner, supra note 1, at 1064-65 (“In 2002, the federal government began a powerful publicity campaign 
connecting the ‘war on drugs’ with the ‘war on terrorism.’”). 
119 See supra Part IIb. 
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respondent must show to overcome the presumption;120 one of these criteria was “the absence of 
any violence or threat of violence, implicit or otherwise, associated with the offense.”121  In 
making the exceptions to his new rule very limited – only those who could demonstrate all of the 
criteria he mentioned (not just the absence of violence) could escape the PSC presumption – the 
Attorney General likely was marking a new era of non-violent crimes as PSCs.122 
 
d. Possession of Child Pornography as a PSC 
 
The Board’s 2012 decision in Matter of R-A-M-123 is a good example of how non-violent 
crimes have become PSCs in recent years.  Mr. R-A-M- feared persecution in Honduras because 
of his sexual orientation and sought asylum and withholding of removal.124  While he was in 
removal proceedings, he was convicted of possession of child pornography under a California 
statute that punished knowingly possessing or controlling any image or film that depicts a person 
under the age of eighteen engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.125  His sentence was 280 
days of imprisonment and 3 years’ probation.126  The Board upheld the judge’s decision that his 
offense was an aggravated felony and therefore he had a statutory PSC for asylum purposes.127  
However, as his sentence was less than five years, he was eligible for withholding, so the 
immigration judge was permitted to look at the nature and circumstances of his crime.128   
The immigration judge had determined that the crime, although serious, was not 
particularly serious because he had a light sentence; he was convicted of possession instead of 
production, marketing, or distribution of child pornography; and the children already had been 
victimized before he downloaded the pornographic materials.129  What is most critical is the final 
portion of the immigration judge’s decision.  The judge considered that the respondent was 
receiving treatment for his drug and alcohol problem and was scheduled for treatment at an 
                                                            
120 Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276-77 (reasoning that there may be the “very rare case where an alien would be able to 
demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances that justify treating a particular drug trafficking crime as 
falling short of [the PSC] standard”). 
121 See id. at 276-77.  The six criteria the AG listed to overcome the PSC presumption for a drug trafficking crime 
are “at a minimum:” 
(1) a very small quantity of controlled substance; (2) a very modest amount of money paid for the drugs in 
the offending transaction; (3) merely peripheral involvement by the alien in the criminal activity, 
transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the absence of any violence or threat of violence, implicit or otherwise, 
associated with the offense; (5) the absence of any organized crime or terrorist organization involvement, 
direct or indirect, in relation to the offending activity; and (6) the absence of any adverse or harmful effect 
of the activity or transaction on juveniles. 
Id.   
122 The Ninth Circuit deferred to Y-L-, upholding the Attorney General’s authority under the statute to create strong 
presumptions for PSC determinations.  Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2007).  The 
court held, however, that because he pled guilty to drug trafficking prior to the Y-L- decision, it could not be applied 
to his case retroactively.  Id. at 950-53.  In unpublished cases, several other courts accepted Y-L- as a proper exercise 
of the Attorney General’s discretion.  See, e.g., Infante v. AG, 574 Fed. Appx. 142, 145-47 (3d Cir. 2014); Diaz v. 
Holder, 501 Fed. Appx. 734, 738 (10th Cir. 2012); Galeneh v. Ashcroft, 153 Fed. Appx. 881, 886 (3d Cir. 2005). 
123 25 I. & N. Dec. 657 (BIA 2012). 
124 Id. at 657. 
125 Id. at 658 (citing California Penal Code Secs. 311.11(a), 311.4(d)(1)). 
126 R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 658. 
127 See id. at 658-59 (reasoning that his offense was an aggravated felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(I) 
because it is “described in” 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which punishes the knowing possession of child pornography). 
128 See id. at 659. 
129 Id. at 660. 
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inpatient facility upon his release from DHS detention.130  For this reason, the judge found, 
“there was no indication that the respondent had been violent in the past or would be violent in 
the future.”131 
The Board reversed, reviewing the judge’s decision de novo,132 and finding that the 
conviction was for a particularly serious crime.  The Board first cited to the societal harms of 
child pornography.133  The Board conceded that possession was not as serious as production or 
distribution and thus found that it could look beyond the elements of his offense to the facts and 
circumstances of his crime.134  The only egregious fact the Board could point to was that “he had 
repeatedly downloaded numerous images and videos of child pornography for his own personal 
use,”135 and thus the Board cycled back to repeating the harmful effects of child pornography on 
society.136  The Board also found unimportant the relatively light sentence he received because 
“‘the severity of the crime is not always reflected in the length of the sentence.’”137 
In R-A-M-, the Board noted the shift from its past decisions that violent crimes against 
persons tended to be PSCs.138  The Board stated: “while an offense is more likely to be 
considered particularly serious if it is against a person, it does not have to be violent to be a 
particularly serious crime.”139  To support this proposition, the Board cited Y-L-, the 2002 
Attorney General decision that drug trafficking convictions presumptively constitute particularly 
serious crimes,140 and, inexplicably, a 2000 BIA case holding that a “robbery conviction, which 
involves a violent crime against a person, is a particularly serious crime.”141   The Board also 
cited N-A-M-, a 2007 Board case that this article argues gutted the Frentescu test in order to 
sweep more offenses into the PSC category.142   
 
e. Financial Crimes as PSCs 
 
There has been a series of unpublished cases by the Board finding that non-violent 
financial crimes were PSCs; federal circuit courts of appeals have upheld decisions that mail 
fraud,143 tax fraud and money laundering,144 securities fraud,145 and unauthorized access to a 
                                                            
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 658 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii)). 
133 R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 660 (“Child pornography is an intrinsically serious offense that is directly related to 
the sexual abuse of children.”). 
134 See id. at 661. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 662 (quoting N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 344 n.8). 
138 See supra Part IIb. 
139 R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 662 (quoting N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342). 
140 Id. at 662 (citing Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 274). 
141 See id. at 662; S-V-, 22 I. & N Dec. at 1308. 
142 See infra notes 219-28 and accompanying text.  Federal courts of appeals, in unpublished decisions, have cited to 
R-A-M- approvingly.  See, e.g., Torres v. Lynch, 2015 WL 3895005, *1 (9th Cir. June 24, 2015) (upholding Board’s 
decision that child pornography conviction was a PSC); Pervez v. Holder, 546 Fed. Appx. 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(citing R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 662) (upholding Board’s decision that indecent liberties with a child was a PSC 
and stating “[w]hile no child was actually harmed or even involved as a potential victim, a particularly serious crime 
does not have to be violent or potentially violent”). 
143 Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 2012).  
144 Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2010). 
145 Kaplun v. AG of U.S., 602 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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computer146 were PSCs.  In these cases, federal courts either determined they had no jurisdiction 
to review PSC, a discretionary decision,147 or reviewed the decisions under the highly deferential 
abuse of discretion standard of review.148   
In a 2009 case, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a Board decision that unauthorized access to 
a computer was a PSC.149  The Board had dismissed an argument that persons who commit 
economic crimes do not constitute a danger to the community by describing this claim as 
“speculative” and “unpersuasive.”150  The Eighth Circuit ruled that it had no jurisdiction to 
determine a discretionary decision regarding the proper weighing of the Frentescu factors.151  
Similarly, in a 2010 Eighth Circuit decision upholding a Board decision that securities fraud was 
a PSC, the court first decided that it did not have jurisdiction over discretionary decisions such as 
PSCs.152  In dicta, however, the court responded to the petitioner’s argument that “the BIA ‘has 
never held that…a non-violent white collar criminal offense could constitute a particularly 
serious crime.’”153  The court reasoned that the inclusion of aggravated felonies in the PSC bar 
meant that Congress intended some nonviolent crimes to be PSCs (as the aggravated felony 
definition contains non-violent offenses such as fraud)154 and that “nothing in our precedent 
suggests that a financial crime cannot, as a matter of law, be a particularly serious crime.”155  In a 
case where a federal court reviewed the Board’s decision, in 2012, the Ninth Circuit upheld a 
Board decision that mail fraud was a PSC.156  The Board in this case upheld an immigration 
judge’s decision that, based on the “good likelihood” that the fraud could happen again, the 
petitioner “certainly would be a danger to the community.”157  There the Ninth Circuit 
specifically stated that the petitioner had not raised a legal challenge to the Board’s interpretation 
of the withholding statute, but only challenged the weighing of the Frentescu factors.158  The 
                                                            
146 Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2009). 
147 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (no judicial review of discretionary decisions); but cf. Kucana v. Holder, 558 
U.S. 233 (2010) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only bars judicial review for decisions that are made 
discretionary by Congress); Arbid, 700 F.3d at 383-34 (reasoning, post-Kucana, that PSC determinations can be 
reviewed notwithstanding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) because the statute does not explicitly vest discretion in the 
Attorney General). 
148 See, e.g., Arbid, 700 F.3d at 385 (quoting Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000) (“On abuse-of-
discretion review, we may disturb the BIA’s ruling if the BIA acted ‘arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.’”).  
149 Tian, 576 F.3d at 896-98. 
150 Id. at 897.  The Board also held that it did not consider a “separate determination of danger to the community to 
be necessary,” citing N-A-M-.  Id; cf. infra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (discussing how the N-A-M- test is 
flawed). 
151 Id. at 895, 897. 
152 Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 267-68.  This portion of the ruling was disagreed with by the Ninth Circuit in Arbid.  See 
Arbid, 700 F.3d at 384-85 (relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) that 
the judicial review bar of discretionary decisions contained in 8 USC 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only applied to those 
discretionary decisions made discretionary by statute). 
153 Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 267. 
154 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 
155 Id. at 268.  In a 2010 Fifth Circuit case upholding a Board decision that tax fraud and money laundering were 
PSCs, the court held that the Board need not individually consider each Frentescu factor before reaching its 
decision; it was enough that the Board engaged in some case-specific analysis.  Hakim, 628 F.3d at 152, 154-55.  
The petitioner did not raise whether the Board had properly weighed the Frentescu factors and therefore the court 
did not need to decide whether it had jurisdiction to review such a discretionary decision.  Id. at 155 n.1. 
156 See Arbid, 700 F.3d at 385-86. 
157 Id. at 385. 
158 Id. at 385 n. 4. 
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court, reviewing the Board’s decision on abuse-of-discretion review, did not disturb the Board’s 
ruling.159  
 
III. Explaining How Non-Violent Crimes Became PSCs 
 
How did we get to a place where the PSC bar, which was once reserved for “extreme” 
cases160 and typically included only violent offenses, has come to include nonviolent offenses 
like drug trafficking, possession of child pornography, and financial crimes?    This section 
explores two theories for why non-violent crimes are PSCs: the mistrusting criminal judges 
effect and sweeping effect. 
   
a. The Mistrusting Criminal Judges Effect 
 
The Board’s increasing lack of faith in criminal judges, which this article terms the 
“mistrusting criminal judges effect,” is one explanation for why many nonviolent offenses are 
PSCs.  When the Board decided Frentescu, one of the four factors a judge was directed to 
consider was the type of sentence imposed.161 The Board, finding that Mr. Frentescu had not 
been convicted of a PSC, stated that his suspended sentence with three months to serve “as 
viewed by the state court judge, reflect[ed] upon the seriousness of the applicant’s danger to the 
community.”162  This statement indicated the Board’s faith in the criminal judge’s ability to 
identify dangerous criminals by imposing on them the longest sentences.163   
The Attorney General’s 2002 Y-L- decision, where AG Ashcroft found that drug 
trafficking convictions were presumptively PSCs, marked the beginning of the mistrusting 
criminal judges effect in PSC determinations.164  AG Ashcroft reversed three Board decisions 
finding that drug trafficking convictions with less than a five-year sentence were not PSCs.165  
The Board had based its decision partially on the respondents’ cooperation with federal 
authorities in collateral investigations, their limited criminal history records, and the fact that 
they were sentenced at the low end of the applicable sentencing guideline ranges.166  The Board 
also had read the IIRIRA amendments to the PSC bar, which classified only aggravated felonies 
with five-year sentences as per se PSCs, as reflecting a Congressional desire to replace 
classifications based on category or type of crime with classifications based on length of 
sentence imposed.167  The Attorney General disagreed, stating: “the discretionary authority 
reserved to the Attorney General with respect to offenses from which less severe sentences flow 
is clearly intended to enable him to emphasize factors other than length of sentence.”168  He set 
forth a presumption that drug trafficking convictions were per se PSCs, and only in extraordinary 
                                                            
159 Id. at 385-86. 
160 See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 246. 
161 See id. at 247. 
162 Id. 
163 See id.; see also L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 655-56 (deciding that alien smuggling for commercial gain was not a 
PSC is partially influenced by the sentence imposed, 3 and a half months of time served). 
164 See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 273-74.   
165 See id. at 273. 
166 See id. at 272. 
167 Id. at 273. 
168 Id. at 274. 
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and compelling circumstances could a noncitizen overcome the presumption.169  Notably absent 
from his list of criteria that might overcome the PSC presumption were several criteria that, for a 
criminal judge, would justify a lower sentence.170  He wrote: “I emphasize here that such 
commonplace circumstances as cooperation with law enforcement authorities, limited criminal 
histories, downward departures at sentencing, and post-arrest (let alone post-conviction) claims 
of contrition or innocence do not justify such a deviation.”171 
In 2007, the Board in N-A-M- solidified the mistrusting criminal judges effect in the PSC 
analysis.172  There the respondent had been sentenced to no term of imprisonment for his 
menacing conviction, yet the Board found this fact unimportant.173  The Board wrote:  
 
Factors that are subsequent and unrelated to the commission of the offense, such as 
cooperation with law enforcement authorities, bear only on sentencing.  Similarly, 
offender characteristics may operate to reduce a sentence but do not diminish the gravity 
of a crime.  Therefore, the sentence imposed is not the most accurate or salient factor to 
consider in determining the seriousness of the offense.174 
 
The Board’s rationale begs a question about its faith in the criminal judge.  Would a criminal 
judge fail to sentence someone who was a danger to the community to prison time, even if there 
were compelling personal circumstances?   
In 2012, the Board again stated its lack of faith in the criminal judge when it decided that 
possession of child pornography was a PSC in R-A-M-.  Notwithstanding the respondent’s 
sentence of 280 days in prison and three years of probation, the Board stated “the nature of the 
respondent’s crime is so condemnable that the length of sentence is less significant to the 
analysis.”175  This quote highlights the Board’s substitution of its own judgment for that of the 
criminal judge: if the crime was so condemnable, wouldn’t the criminal judge have given a more 
severe sentence?   
 This mistrusting criminal judges effect is apparent outside of the Board’s PSC case law.  
One example is the Board’s refusal to recognize vacaturs of guilty pleas by criminal courts if 
those vacaturs are for immigration reasons only.176  Following the harsh effects of the 1996 laws, 
many noncitizens returned to state court, seeking to vacate their criminal convictions.  Since a 
criminal conviction formed the basis of deportation, this would alleviate the immigration impact, 
thus preventing an otherwise legal immigrant from being deported.177  At a minimum, the 
vacatur of the conviction might cause the noncitizen to be eligible for relief, thus allowing an 
immigration judge to exercise her discretion in evaluating the equities in a noncitizen’s case.178  
                                                            
169 See supra note 121 for a listing of those 6 criteria. 
170 See id. 
171 Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 277. 
172 See N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 343. 
173 See id. 
174 Id. 
175 R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 662. 
176 Matter of Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003) (“Thus, if a court with jurisdiction vacates a conviction 
based on a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent no longer has a ‘conviction’ within the 
meaning of section 101(a)(48)(A). If, however, a court vacates a conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the 
underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent remains ‘convicted’ for immigration purposes.”) 
177 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (basing most grounds of crime-related deportability on “conviction”). 
178 For example, the INA provides for cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents who have not been 
convicted of an aggravated felony and who have been in the U.S. continuously for seven years after admission in 
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State court judges often were sympathetic, vacating a criminal conviction so that the noncitizen 
could avoid deportation or be eligible for relief.  In 2003, the Board saw what was happening – 
that sympathetic criminal court judges were vacating convictions – and decided to blunt the 
impact of the practice.  The Board decided in Matter of Pickering that if a conviction was 
vacated for immigration purposes only, that vacatur would not count for immigration 
purposes.179   
Another example of the mistrusting criminal judges effect is the Board’s refusal to grant 
bond to an individual, even though a criminal court has released that same person on bail or 
parole.180  The Immigration Judge Benchbook, which is written and updated by the Executive 
Office of Immigration Review (the agency that houses the Board and immigration judges), 
provides guidance on immigration substance and procedure for judges.181  First introduced in 
2007, it is intended to be a guide for judges and not a substitute for judges checking the law in 
their circuit courts.182  Nonetheless, it is a significant indicator of how the agency perceives the 
importance of various factors.  The Benchbook, under the heading “Introductory Guides: Bond,” 
lists all of the significant factors that judges should consider when determining whether to 
release a noncitizen on bond.183  Listed as a “less significant factor” in a bond determination is 
early release from prison, parole, or low bond in related criminal proceedings.184 
 On a legislative level, perhaps the best example of mistrusting criminal judges is the 
elimination of the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation (“JRAD”) in 1990.  When 
Congress first made noncitizens deportable for criminal conduct in 1917, it allowed state court 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
any status, five of which was after being admitted as a permanent resident.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a); see also Matter 
of C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11-12 (BIA 1998) (describing the equitable factors the judge should consider when 
considering an application for cancellation of removal). 
179 See Pickering, 23 I. & N Dec. at 624.  The Sixth Circuit, reviewing the Board’s decision in Pickering, agreed 
with the Board’s ruling as a matter of law, yet decided that in Mr. Pickering’s case, the government did not show 
that the criminal court vacated his conviction solely for immigration purposes.  See Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 
263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006).  The Board later decided that a sentence vacated for immigration reasons only would still 
be valid.  See Matter of Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 849, 852 (BIA 2005) (“While the language and purpose of 
section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act provided support for the interpretive approach we adopted in Pickering as it related 
to the existence of a “conviction,” the Immigration Judge's application of the Pickering rationale to sentence 
modifications has no discernible basis in the language of the Act.”). 
180 See, e.g., Matter of Andrade, 19 I. & N Dec. 488, 490 (BIA 1987) (“Indeed, we find that the immigration judge 
placed undue reliance on the respondent’s parole in reaching her decision.  Incarcerated individuals may be released 
from prison early on parole for reasons other than rehabilitation.  We do not believe this factor in and of itself carries 
significant weight in determining whether an alien is a good bail risk for immigration purposes.”); cf. Matter of 
Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177, 179 (BIA 1979) (“[W]e find that the immigration judge placed an undue reliance on the 
pending criminal charges and the lack of a large criminal bond in setting the significant bond ordered in this case.  
We find it inappropriate to speculate as to the possible rationale for the one dollar bond set in the criminal 
proceeding, and we do not agree that the fact that a low criminal bond was set somehow weighs in favor of a larger 
immigration bond.”). 
181 See Executive Office of Immigration Review, Immigration Judge Benchbook (last updated Apr. 15, 2015), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook.  
182 Id. at “Introduction.” 
183 The Benchbook lists as significant factors fixed address in the U.S., length of residence, family ties in the U.S. 
(particularly those that can confer benefits on the noncitizen), employment history in the U.S., immigration record, 
attempts to escape from authorities, prior failures to appear for scheduled court proceedings, criminal record 
(including extensiveness and recency), and ineligibility for relief from removal.  See id. at “Bond/Custody,” 6-7. 
184 Id. at 7 (citing Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. 488; Shaw, 17 I. & N. Dec. 177). 
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sentencing judges to recommend “that such alien shall not be deported.”185  Thus, sentencing 
judges could eliminate the harsh effects of the deportation laws by considering, on a case-by-
case basis, who was deserving of a recommendation against deportation.186  However, Congress 
first circumscribed JRADs for drug crimes in 1952, and then in 1990 completely eliminated the 
JRAD.187   
In another example of Congress mistrusting criminal judges, Congress amended the 
definition of “conviction” in 1996 with IIRIRA.  The new definition encompasses state court 
rehabilitative statutes such as deferred adjudications that previously would not have led to 
deportation because the criminal judge did not intend them to be convictions.188  Congress thus 
explicitly overruled a 1988 Board decision that allowed adjudications that were “deferred” for 
state purposes to not count as “convictions” in immigration law.189  Finally, Congress also in 
1996 defined a “sentence” or “term of imprisonment” (which carries significant consequences 
because many convictions are aggravated felonies by virtue of a term of imprisonment of at least 
one year)190 to mean a suspended sentence.191  Thus regardless of whether a criminal judge 
intended to signal that a defendant was not dangerous or his crime was not serious and therefore 
he deserved no prison time, that suspended sentence would be seen as no different than a 
sentence where the offender spent the entire time in prison as a consequence of his conduct. 
                                                            
185 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361-64 (2010) (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, 29 Stat. 
889-890) (describing history of JRAD). 
186 See id. 
187 See id.  Margaret Taylor and Ronald F. Wright have given a full discussion of the history of JRADs, including 
the successor and “flip-side” to JRADs, the power given to sentencing judges to enter orders of a removal, a process 
that never truly got “off the ground.”  See Margaret Taylor and Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as 
Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L. J. 1131, 1143-57 (2002); see also Legomsky, supra note 1, at 498-500 (“Federal 
sentencing judges have been given ample power to order removal but, with the abolition of JRADs, now have 
almost no power to prevent it.”). 
188 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) defines “conviction” for immigration purposes as: 
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, 
where-- 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or 
has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be 
imposed. 
189 See H.R.Rep. No. 104–828 (1996), 1996 WL 563320, at *224 (“This new provision ... clarifies Congressional 
intent that even in cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original finding or confession of guilt is sufficient to 
establish a ‘conviction’ for purposes of the immigration laws.”); see also Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 551-
52 (BIA 1988) (interpreting “convicted of” in the INA as encompassing the first two prongs of the new definition at 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) but adding a third: “a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person 
violates the terms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court's order, without availability 
of further proceedings regarding the person's guilt or innocence of the original charge”). 
190 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (crime of violence is aggravated felony if term of imprisonment of at least 
one year is imposed); 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft offense is aggravated felony if term of imprisonment of at least one year 
is imposed). 
191 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (“Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an 
offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any 
suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.”); H.R.Rep. No. 
104–828 (1996), 1996 WL 563320, at *224 (“[This new definition [of term of imprisonment] clarifies that in cases 
where immigration consequences attach depending upon the length of a term of sentence, any court-ordered 
sentence is considered to be ‘actually imposed,’ including where the court has suspended the imposition of the 
sentence.”). 
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There remain areas of immigration law in which Congress has maintained some 
deference to state criminal judges.  For example, a “crime involving moral turpitude” is a ground 
of inadmissibility,192 yet has a “petty offense exception” if the criminal court imposed a sentence 
of six months or less and the state legislature set the maximum possible punishment at one 
year.193  Many “aggravated felony” categories are not triggered unless the criminal court imposes 
a one-year sentence.194  Similarly, the statutory PSC bar for withholding is only triggered if the 
court imposes a five-year sentence for an aggravated felony.195  The respect given to criminal 
judges in these provisions was blunted, however, by the “term of imprisonment” and “sentence” 
definitions Congress set forth with IIRIRA.196  Also, what little deference still remains to the 
criminal court judge is muted by the many offenses that have been swept into the meaning of 
terms such as “aggravated felony” and “crime involving moral turpitude.”  This issue is taken up 
in the next section.   
 
b. The Sweeping Effect  
 
The expansive reading of “particularly serious crime” is part of what this article terms 
“the sweeping effect:” the trend of sweeping many offenses into crimmigration terms of art.  
While other scholars have noted the increasing merger between criminal and immigration law,197 
which has led to an expanded list of crimes that may result in removal,198 none has specifically 
named this phenomenon.  The sweeping effect is best illustrated by the saying “if all you have is 
a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”  Except that the Board (and Congress) have had a 
toolbox full of hammers: namely, terms of art that are vague and able to easily be manipulated, 
such as “crime involving moral turpitude,” “aggravated felony,” and “particularly serious 
crime.”199  Because these terms have such harsh immigration consequences – leading to 
inadmissibility, deportation, mandatory detention, and ineligibility for relief from removal – the 
Board and Congress have made significant efforts to harness the ambiguity of these terms by 
sweeping many crimes into each bucket.  This section will explore what this article terms the 
“sweeping effect” in various areas of Board case law, including the PSC analysis. 
 
                                                            
192 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
193 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II); see also Juliet Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1730-31 (2011) (citing to petty offense exception to CIMT inadmissibility as a place where 
federal immigration law relies on state criminal justice actors to exempt certain crimes from the harshness of 
removal). 
194 8 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(43)(F) (crime of violence with one-year sentence); 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft or burglary offense 
with one-year sentence); 1101(a)(43)(R) (bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles with altered 
identification numbers with a one-year sentence); 1101(a)(43)(S) (obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a 
witness with a one-year sentence). 
195 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
196 See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. 
197 See, e.g., Stumpf, Crimmigration, supra note 1; Legomsky, supra note 1; Garcia Hernández, supra note 1. 
198 See, e.g., Garcia Hernández, supra note 1, at 1484; Jennifer Chacón, Whose Community Shield?  Examining the 
Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 323-24 (2007); Miller, Citizenship 
and Severity, supra note 1, at 614-615. 
199 See, e.g., Holper, Deportation for A Sin, supra note 62 (arguing that the term “crime involving moral turpitude” 
is void for vagueness); see also Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1041-43 (considering and rejecting argument that the term 
“particularly serious crime” is void for vagueness); cf. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2257 (holding that the residual clause 
of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which contains a “violent felony” definition that is very 
similar to one prong of the crime of violence aggravated felony definition, 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), is void for vagueness). 
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i. Particularly Serious Crimes 
 
The plain meaning of “particularly serious” reveals the narrowness of this limited 
category of crimes.  Congress chose to include not one but two modifiers of “crime” in the 
withholding statute.  The dictionary defines “particularly” to mean “in a special or unusual 
degree,” or “to an extent greater than in other cases.”200  “Serious” means “excessive or 
impressive in quality, quantity, extent, or degree.”201   Also, “a ‘particularly serious crime’ must 
be more serious than a serious non–political crime, itself already a limited category.”202  That an 
offense is serious enough to be punishable in the criminal code does not mean it is serious 
enough to be labeled a PSC.  Rather, the verb and adverb should mean something.   
However, what the Board has done in recent years is find that crimes are PSCs because 
there is harm to a victim.203  Yet for every crime, there is harm to a victim; otherwise it would 
not be punishable as a crime.204   For today’s PSC analysis, it does not matter that the harm is 
attenuated for the crime to trigger a PSC finding.  Take, for example, drug trafficking.205  
According to Attorney General Ashcroft, society is harmed because illegal drugs are sold, which 
causes people to die of overdoses or become disabled by drug addiction.206  Those who are 
disabled by drug addiction harm society further by robbing persons or property to feed their 
addiction.207  Society is further harmed because “a considerable amount of money is drained 
from the economy of the United States annually because of the unlawful trafficking in drugs.”208  
Also, substantial violence is present at all levels of the distribution chain.209 
It is confounding that a crime with such an inchoate, indirect set of harms could be a 
PSC.  If, for example, a noncitizen convicted of drug trafficking also robbed someone at 
gunpoint to support a drug habit, wouldn’t this lead to a separate conviction for armed robbery, 
which the Board has held was a PSC?210  Compare these inchoate set of harms to the Board’s 
decision in 1999 that alien smuggling was not a PSC.211  Although there was significant potential 
for bodily harm – the respondent hid a woman in a compartment built underneath the floor of a 
                                                            
200 Mirriam-Webster Dictionary, available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary. 
201 Id. 
202 Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1049; Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. 
203 See Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 343 (BIA 2014) (“The presence or absence of harm to the victim is 
also a pertinent factor in evaluating whether a crime was particularly serious.”). 
204 See, e.g., Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What's Wrong with Harmless Theories of Punishment, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1215, 1229 (2004) (“Crime inflicts harms on victims. Punishments are designed to ‘answer’ crimes by 
inflicting counter-harms on the offender. …Officially declaring a behavior a ‘crime’ amounts to recognition that the 
behavior causes harm.”); Bernard Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
109, 192-93 (1999) (arguing that the harm principle, which justifies punishment only because there is a resulting 
harm, has proliferated to justify punishing so many activities – “activities that have traditionally been associated 
with moral offense” – that the original harm principle itself, which “was never equipped to determine the relative 
importance of harms,” is no longer useful); id. at 120 (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport 
ed., 1978) (1859)) (introducing the harm principle by stating, “[t]hat the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”). 
205 See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 275. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 276. 
210 See, e.g., L-S-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 974-75. 
211 See L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 655. 
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van – the “respondent did not, in fact, cause [the alien] harm.”212  The evolution of how the 
Board has defined a PSC, with respect to any harm that may have been caused (or could be 
caused), demonstrates how many crimes can be swept into the PSC bucket. 
Congress also did its part to expand which crimes would statutorily be PSCs.  As 
explained in Part I, in 1990, Congress rendered all aggravated felonies PSCs for withholding 
purposes.  The ever-increasing sweep of the “aggravated felony” definition, 213 however, caused 
Congress with AEDPA in 1996 to inject some consideration of international treaty obligations 
when considering whether an aggravated felony was a PSC.214  That same year, Congress 
decided that only aggravated felonies with five year sentences were automatically PSCs, which 
would comply with U.S. treaty obligations.215  For asylum, however, Congress deemed 
aggravated felonies to be automatically PSCs.216  The Board, in response to Congress’ 
broadening PSC definition, did not stop there; it decided in its 2007 N-A-M- decision that other 
offenses could still be considered on a case-by-case basis to be a PSC.217  Circuit courts 
generally deferred to the Board’s decision on this issue.218 
What is worse, for those crimes escaping the statutory categorization as a PSC, the Board 
in N-A-M- set forth a test that eliminated the fourth and “most important” Frentescu factor, 
“whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the 
community.”219  To explain such a change, the Board articulated that their approach to 
determining whether a crime is particularly serious had evolved since Frentescu.  “For example,” 
the Board wrote, “once an alien is found to have committed a particularly serious crime, we no 
longer engage in a separate determination to address whether the alien is a danger to the 
community.”220  The Board purported to rely on Carballe for this omission, but completely 
misapplied Carballe’s holding regarding dangerousness.221  In Carballe, the Board held that, 
once a judge applied the four Frentescu factors (of which dangerousness was an essential key), 
there was no need to engage in a separate determination of dangerousness, based on future 
dangerousness.222  What the Board did in N-A-M- was authorize judges to not engage in any 
                                                            
212 See id. at 654-56. 
213 See infra Part IIIbiii. 
214 See AEDPA § 413(f); Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1040 (quoting Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 246) (discussing that 
the AEDPA amendment to PSC was needed because “[t]he definition of ‘aggravated felony’ under the INA did 
not…remain focused on ‘very’ grave crimes, let alone ‘extreme cases.’”). 
215 See IIRIRA § 305. 
216 See IIRIRA § 604. 
217 See N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 341. 
218 See, e.g., Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011); Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 156 (2d 
Cir. 2008; but see Alaka v. Atty. Gen’l of the U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 104 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The plain language and 
structure (i.e., context) of the statute indicate that an offense must be an aggravated felony to be sufficiently 
‘serious.’”).  Following the Board’s decision in N-A-M-, where the Board rejected the Third Circuit’s rationale in 
Alaka, the Board held that it would follow its decision in N-A-M- in the Third Circuit.  See Matter of M-H-, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 46 (BIA 2012)  (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-85 
(2005) for the holding that courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, regardless of the circuit 
court’s contrary precedent, unless the prior court decision holds that the construction follows from the unambiguous 
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion). 
219 N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342; Frentescu, 18 I & N. Dec. at 247. 
220 N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342 (citing Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357). 
221 See id. 
222 See Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360; see also Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1039 (“Carballe accepted and reiterated 
Frentescu’s reliance on dangerousness as the sine qua non of a particularly serious crime.”). 
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determination of dangerousness.223  The impact of this missing fourth factor became clear in 
decisions such as R-A-M-, where the Board managed to skirt any reference to dangerousness 
when it decided possession of child pornography was a PSC, and one of the Board cases 
deciding that a financial crime was a PSC.224  By conflating the two dangerousness assessments, 
the Board in N-A-M- created a confusing and internally inconsistent new precedent225 that is 
unmoored from the statutory text and its Protocol origins, which require there to be danger to the 
community.226  Yet, because the Board purported to be applying old case law, it did not set forth 
a long explanation, as an agency normally would when it changes course.227  For this reason, 
circuit courts reviewing the decision felt constrained by its prior rulings upholding Carballe that 
there was no need for a separate determination of dangerousness.228   
Thus, what we see in recent years is the Board’s sweeping effect in action, putting almost 
any offense into the PSC category, without regard to the fact that this is a term of art, reserved 
                                                            
223 Ms. N-A-M- argued that the circumstances of the crime indicate that she was acting in self-defense, so 
circumstances do not indicate a danger to the community.  N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 343 n.7.  In response, the Board 
said “we are not persuaded that she does not pose any future danger to the community.”  Id. at 342-43.  By injecting 
the word “future” into Ms. NAM’s argument, the Board was able to give the appearance of following Carballe’s 
holding that there need be no separate determination of dangerousness.  See id. 
224 See R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 662 (quoting N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342)) ([T]he immigration judge’s belief 
that the respondent would not be violent in the future is not dispositive of whether his conviction is for a particularly 
serious crime.  As we explained in Matter of N-A-M-, it is not necessary to make a separate determination whether 
the alien is a danger to the community.  The focus ‘is on the nature of the crime and not the likelihood of future 
serious misconduct.’”); see also Tian, 576 F.3d at 897 (upholding Board’s decision that unauthorized access to a 
computer is a PSC because, due to N-A-M-, “a separate determination of danger to the community is not 
necessary”). 
225 In July 2014, the Board suddenly brought back the fourth Frentescu factor, identifying dangerousness as “the 
pivotal standard by which particularly serious crimes are judged,” without acknowledging that it had ever departed 
from Frentescu test.  See Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 343 (BIA 2014) (citing Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 
1041).  This created a problem of internally inconsistent precedent for judges to apply.  The decision is too new to 
know how often the Board will cite to it instead of N-A-M-, although it appears that the Board now cites to G-G-S- 
as the “current law with respect to a [PSC] determination.”  In Re: Omar Koran Smith, 2015 WL 4761254, at *1 
(BIA July 22, 2015). 
226 See generally Part I. 
227 See See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981 (“Unexplained inconsistency is . . . a reason for holding an interpretation to be 
an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act.”).   
228 See, e.g., N-A-M- v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Al-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390, 393 
(10th Cir. 1995)); but see id. at 1059-60 (Henry, J., concurring) (“Despite the clear presence of the phrase in the 
statute and the logical pronouncement in Frentescu that the phrase is the most important factor, the ‘danger to the 
community’ prong is now absent from the BIA's reiteration of the relevant factors in this case…. the BIA's 
continually competing and definitionally inconsistent constructions of § 1231 frustrate our function as a reviewing 
court and threaten the reasonableness of its interpretations.”); see also Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1041 (“As 
demonstrated by the BIA’s continued reliance on Carballe, N-A-M- did not countenance any change in the Board’s 
longstanding focus on dangerousness as the ‘essential key’ to determining whether an alien’s conviction constitutes 
a conviction for a particularly serious crime.”); Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342) (rejecting argument that the BIA made a legal error in not applying all four 
Frentescu factors by reasoning that the Board’s test has evolved, and the PSC test no longer requires the BIA to 
engage in a “separate determination to address whether the alien is a danger to the community”).  Arguing before the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the government suggested that, due to N-A-M-, dangerousness was no longer the 
essential touchstone for particularly serious crime determinations.  The court rejected this argument, stating “[t]his 
assertion contradicts the statutory text, which allows the Attorney General to deny withholding of removal if the 
Attorney General decides that ‘the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is 
a danger to the community of the United States.’”  Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1046-47.   
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for the “extreme” cases.229  This trend is similar to what the Board has done with other 
crimmigration terms of art. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude 
 
Crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), which is one of the oldest criminal grounds 
of inadmissibility,230 was incorporated into the criminal grounds of deportability in 1917.231  
Successive legislation saw no efforts to define the term,232 perhaps because in 1951 the Supreme 
Court held that it was not void for vagueness.233  In 1996, Congress expanded who could be 
deported for a single CIMT: under the prior construction, a sentence of one year had to be 
imposed by the state court; the new law allowed for deportation if a one-year sentence may be 
imposed.234  Congress left the meaning of the term CIMT to the Board.  The Board then took 
every opportunity to sweep more crimes into the CIMT bucket. 
In a prior article, I described how the term CIMT allows immigration judges to make 
judgments about the “moral standards prevailing at the time,” thus placing them in the role of 
God, passing judgment on the morals of the noncitizens whose cases lie in their hands.235 I 
describe several circumstances where the Board has swept more crimes into the CIMT category.  
For example, failure to register as a sex offender,236 aggravated DUI,237 and domestic violence238 
are each crimes that, once brought to the attention of the Board, fit within the broad CIMT 
category.   In these examples, the Board looked to “contemporary moral standards” to define 
what type of crime involves moral turpitude.239  Similarly, in the PSC context, we see the Board 
                                                            
229 See Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 246. 
230 An 1891 Act introduced the term CIMT into federal immigration law, excluding from the United States “persons 
who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”  Act of 
March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 
231 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 19, Stat. 874, 875, 889-90 (repealed 1952). 
232 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 182, 204 (1952) (rendering a 
noncitizen inadmissible for a CIMT and deportable for two CIMTs, or a single CIMT committed within five years of 
admission if a sentence of one year or longer was imposed). 
233 See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
234 AEDPA § 435, 110 Stat. at 1274.  
235 See Holper, Deportation for A Sin, supra note 62. 
236 See Matter of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 143, 145–46 (BIA 2007). 
237 Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1196 (BIA 1999). 
238 Matter of Phong Nguyen Tran, 21 I. & N. Dec. 291, 293-94 (BIA 1996). 
239 See Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 146 (“[C]ontemporary moral standards play a significant role in determining, 
at a given time, what crimes involve moral turpitude…Given the serious risk involved in a violation of the duty 
owed by this class of offenders to society, we find that the crime is inherently base or vile and therefore meets the 
criteria for a crime involving moral turpitude.”); Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1196 (“We find that a person who 
drives while under the influence, knowing that he or she is absolutely prohibited from driving, commits a crime so 
base and so contrary to the currently accepted duties that persons owe to one another and to society in general that it 
involves moral turpitude.”); Tran, 21 I. & N Dec. at 294 (“In our opinion, infliction of bodily harm upon a person 
with whom one has such a familial relationship is an acat of depravity which is contrary to accepted moral 
standards.”). 
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referencing general societal harms from crimes such as drug trafficking or possession of child 
pornography.240  In both circumstances, we see the Board ignoring the modifiers of “crime” that 
might limit which offenses fall into that category; the terms instead become catchall 
categories.241  Thus CIMT provides another good example of an expansive crimmigration term 
of art that has felt the sweeping effect. 
 
iii. Aggravated Felonies 
 
In no other category of immigration crimes is the sweeping effect more obvious than the 
aggravated felony definition.242  Initially introduced in the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the 
aggravated felony definition included murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking (or 
attempts or conspiracies to commit those crimes).243  Yet, in the words of Stephen Legomsky, “it 
is now a colossus.”244  Amendments since 1988 have added crimes of violence, theft, receipt of 
stolen property, fraud, forgery, and obstruction of justice, to name a few of a now twenty-one-
part definition.245  With IIRIRA in 1996, Congress also reduced the length of sentence necessary 
to trigger the aggravated felony definition from five years to one year, while at the same time 
defining a sentence to include any suspended sentence.246  As both scholars and practitioners 
frequently comment, “an ‘aggravated felony’ need no longer be either aggravated or a felony.”247 
The Board also has contributed to the sweeping effect in the aggravated felony category.  
For example, as part of “Operation Last Call” in 1998,248 the former INS began charging DUIs 
as aggravated felonies.  The Board took the bait, holding that DUI offenses were crimes of 
                                                            
240 See R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 660; Y-L-, 23 I. & N Dec. 275-76. 
241 Federal courts of appeals generally have given deference to the Board’s decisions about which crimes are CIMTs.  
See, e.g., Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2009) ([W]e conclude that, once the elements 
of the petitioner's offense are established, our review of the BIA's determination that such offense constitutes a 
‘crime of moral turpitude’ is governed by the same traditional principles of administrative deference we apply to the 
Board's interpretation of other ambiguous terms in the INA.”); see also id. (collecting cases where courts have given 
deference to Board’s CIMT decisions). 
242 See Legomsky, supra note 1, at 483-86 (describing how the aggravated felony concept “has accounted for the 
steadiest and most expansive growth in the range of crimes that give rise to removal”). 
243 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). 
244 Stephen Legomsky, supra note 1, at 484. 
245 See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193 § 4(b)(5), 117 Stat. 2875, 
2879 (adding peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons); IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, Div. C. § 321, 110 Stat. 3636-37 (adding sexual abuse of a minor and rape); AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (adding bribery, forgery, counterfeiting, certain gambling offenses, vehicle trafficking, 
obstruction of justice, perjury, and bribery of a witness); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305 (adding theft, receipt of stolen property, burglary, trafficking in 
fraudulent documents, RICO, certain prostitution offenses, fraud or deceit, tax evasion, and human smuggling); 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (adding “crimes of violence”). 
246 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C. § 321, 110 Stat. 3636-37 (amending aggravated felony definition); see also 
id. at § 322 (amending “term of imprisonment” definition). 
247 See Legomsky, supra note 1, at 485; Demleitner, supra note 1, at 1065 (“Despite the term ‘aggravated felonies,’ 
not all of the offenses falling under this heading are felonies, nor would most people consider some of them 
aggravated.”); American Immigration Council, Aggravated Felonies: An Overview (March 2012), available at: 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/aggravated-felonies-overview (“[D]espite what the ominous-sounding 
name may suggest, an ‘aggravated felony’ need not be ‘aggravated’ or a ‘felony’ to qualify as such a crime.”). 
248 See Chacón, Whose Community Shield, supra note 198, at 345 n.143 (citing William Branigin, INS Reviews DWI 
Deportation Orders, WASH POST A21 (Dec. 22, 1998)) (“Over five hundred individuals were detained by the INS in 
the course of this ‘operation.’”). 
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violence, which would be an aggravated felony if the sentence imposed was at least one year.249  
Several circuit courts disagreed with the Board,250 which prompted the Board to clarify that it 
only would find DUI offenses to be crimes of violence in the circuits that had not decided the 
issue.251  Finally, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in 2004, decided that a DUI 
statute punishing negligently causing serious bodily injury was not a crime of violence 
aggravated felony.252  Evoking common sense, the Court stated,  
 
[W]e cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term ‘crime of 
violence.’ The ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16's emphasis on the use 
of physical force against another person (or the risk of having to use such force in 
committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes that cannot be said 
naturally to include DUI offenses.253 
 
 Another example of the Board’s sweeping effect is drug trafficking aggravated felony 
category.  In 2002, the Board held that felony possession of a controlled substance was a “drug 
trafficking” aggravated felony.254  When the issue reached the Supreme Court, the Court 
reversed the Board, finding that the Board had failed to use common sense when interpreting 
what was a drug trafficking aggravated felony.255  The Court had a subsequent opportunity to 
opine on the interaction between drug laws and deportability,256 and again found that the Board’s 
position lacked common sense.257  Thus with the aggravated felony definition, we see another 
example of the Board (and Congress) attempting to sweep all offenses into a crimmigration term 
of art.  
The sweeping effect can explain why Congress has made more noncitizens deportable at 
the same time it has limited relief.258  There are numerous examples of such effect;259 while this 
                                                            
249 See Matter of Puente, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1006 (BIA 1999); Matter of Magallanes-Garcia, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 
1998). 
250 See, e.g., United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (DUI is not a crime of violence and 
thus is not an aggravated felony); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Bazan-Reyes v. 
INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(same). 
251 See Matter of Ramos, 23 I&N Dec. 336, 339 (BIA 2002). 
252 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004). 
253 Id. at 10. 
254 Matter of Yanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390, 397 (BIA 2002).  The Board reversed its prior decisions holding 
that, for uniformity purposes, offenses would only be aggravated felonies if the federal Controlled Substances Act 
punished them as felonies; simple possession of most offenses would not be punished as a felony in the federal 
system.  See Matter of K-V-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1163 (BIA 1999); Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1992); 
Matter of Barrett, 20 I. & N. Dec. 171 (BIA 1990). 
255 See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 (2006) (“Reading [the statute] the Government's way, then, would often 
turn simple possession into trafficking, just what the English language tells us not to expect, and that result makes us 
very wary of the Government's position.”). 
256 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 581-82 (2010) (holding that a second simple possession offense 
was not an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) because it was not punished as a 
recidivist offense in the state). 
257 See Carachuri, 560 U.S. at 575 (citing Lopez, 549 U.S. at 54) (“Because the English language tells us that most 
aggravated felonies are punishable by sentences far longer than 10 days, and that mere possession of one tablet of 
Xanax does not constitute “trafficking,” Lopez instructs us to be doubly wary of the Government's position in this 
case.”). 
258 For example, with IIRIRA, Congress eliminated the 212(c) waiver for long-term permanent residents, which used 
to be available to LPRs with aggravated felony convictions; with the same legislation, Congress created cancellation 
28 
 
article does not seek to categorize all of them, it demonstrates that this effect exists and has acted 
to limit refugee protection by expanding which crimes count as PSCs.  What is more, in the 
future the sweeping effect may expand further, as new crimmigration terms of art are created.260 
 
 
IV. Mirroring the Severity Revolution in Criminal Law  
 
While the previous section sought to explain the PSC evolution by connecting it to larger 
trends in immigration law, this section explores how the PSC transformation mirrors the severity 
revolution, a trend from the criminal justice system, and draws lessons from such comparison for 
the PSC context. 
 
a. Severity Revolution 
 
A trend that occurred during the 1980’s and 90’s is what criminal scholar Joseph 
Kennedy has termed “the severity revolution,” where there was a dramatic break in the field of 
criminal punishment.261  In contrast to the prior goals of minimizing pain and cruelty in the penal 
process, the “severity revolution” espoused severity of punishment as an overarching good.262  
The severity revolution was both expressive (communicating the message about the seriousness 
of certain types of offenses) and instrumental (focusing on public protection and risk 
management).263  As part of the severity revolution, legislatures responded to courts’ willingness 
to “let off” too many offenders by enacting harsh mandatory minimum sentences,264  thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
of removal for long-term LPRs but made that relief unavailable to LPRs with aggravated felony convictions and 
rendered a noncitizen ineligible if he had certain offenses within the first seven years after admission.  See INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295-97 (2001); IIRIRA § 304(b) . 
259 Another example is the expansive definition of “good moral character,” which is a requirement for naturalization 
and several forms of relief such as cancellation of removal and voluntary departure.  See, e.g., §§ 1229b(b); 
1229c(b); 1427; see also Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for Citizenship, 87 IND. L. 
J. 1571 (2012). 
260 See, e.g., Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the 
United States as Children (June 15, 2012) (barring deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA) to those 
convicted, among other offenses, of a “significant misdemeanor”); 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) (to secure a waiver for a 
“violent or dangerous crime,” applicant for admission must show extraordinary circumstances, such as those 
involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or in cases in which the alien demonstrates exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship). 
261 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 831-32. 
262 See id. at 831; Simon, supra note 7, at 219. 
263 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 856. 
264 See Garcia Hernández, supra note 1, at 1498 (quoting Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War 
on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 113 (2007) (“Rather than continue to 
confide in the neutral role that judges are supposed to occupy, over the next two decades [after the 1970’s] 
policymakers began to portray judges as ‘betrayers of the common good.’”); see also id. at 1499 (discussing 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which established the Sentencing Commission, which in turn issued sentencing 
guidelines to bind federal judges, and the financial incentives Congress provided to states to enact “truth in 
sentencing” laws that required convicted individuals to serve at least 85% of their sentences); William Stuntz, The 
Collapse of American Criminal Justice 227-28 (Harvard Univ. Press 2011) (describing the Warren court’s errors, 
including “siphoning the time of attorneys and judges away from the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence 
and toward the process by which the defendant was arrested, tried, and convicted,” which produced a political and 
legal backlash); Simon, supra note 7, at 236 (discussing “3-Strikes” laws that swept through the country in the mid-
1990s, which “simultaneously expressed mistrust of judges and contempt for the intellectual capacities of repeat 
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decreasing courts’ discretion to consider the whole person and his circumstances.  Discretion was 
shifted into the hands of prosecutors, who could choose among criminal charges and have 
significant negotiating power due to the harsh mandatory minimum sentences, and police, who 
could choose which persons to arrest in the first place.265  Theresa Miller noted the trend in 
immigration law, commenting: “[i]n the years between 1996 and 2001, the immigration system 
bought into the ‘severity revolution’ occurring within the criminal justice system.” 266   
In PSC cases, one can see the impact of the severity revolution, with the Board and AG 
deciding that criminal judges’ decisions about who merited punishment and incarceration were 
not the best indicators of who actually was a danger to the community.267  The types of offenders 
targeted by the severity revolution also is mirrored in the published PSC cases.  As Joseph 
Kennedy wrote, drug dealers, child molesters, and violent criminals became scapegoats for a 
society that lacked a common religion in the 1980’s and 90s.268  He wrote, “[h]orrible crimes 
provide communion for a secular society that no longer comes together within the walls of any 
one church or around any one text.”269  A diverse secular society could rely on punishment of 
these “monstrous offenders” to express a shared sense of the sacred, whereas more homogeneous 
societies could rely on uniform religious beliefs.270  The published PSC cases reflect this same 
scapegoating of such “monstrous offenders:” drug trafficking, violent offenses, and possession of 
child pornography all are PSCs, thus reflecting the perceived danger that these types of offenders 
present to U.S. society.271   
The determinate sentencing schemes of the severity revolution also reflect a “harm-based 
system of penology,”272 which “leaves less room for an individualized assessment of an 
offender’s circumstances.”273  Similarly, the PSC analysis, like the severity revolution, focuses 
not on the individual offender but on the risks presented by certain classes of offenders and the 
harms those crimes cause.274  Rather than focus on the dangerousness or individual 
characteristics of one offender, drug trafficking became a per se PSC based on the generalized 
harm it caused to society.275   Instead of focusing on any particular harms caused by one person 
who possessed child pornography, the Board instead focused on the societal harms that such 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
offenders”); Kennedy, supra note 7, at 850-53 (discussing the turn toward more determinate sentencing processes, 
which was supported by liberals, who were concerned about invidious discrimination in the criminal justice system, 
and conservatives, who supported strict accountability in punishment); Marc Miller and Martin Guggenheim, 
Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 347, 343-44 (1990) (discussing how after the Warren 
court, many perceived that those who were “actually guilty” were freed because of heightened procedural 
protections, thus creating “a system in which final disposition of criminal cases depends more on the conduct of the 
police than on the conduct of the accused.”). 
265 See Garcia Hernández, supra note 1, at 1497, 1499-1500. 
266 Miller, Blurring Boundaries, supra note 1, at 83. 
267 See supra notes 165-75. 
268 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 833. 
269 Id. at 847. 
270 Id. at 848. 
271 See Part II. 
272 Kennedy, supra note 7, at 856 (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for 
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 908-09 (1991)). 
273 Kennedy, supra note 7, at 856. 
274 Theresa Miller noted such categorization and risk management in immigration law by a movement away from 
individualized determinations and toward group-based assessments of dangerousness. She cites examples such as 
mandatory detention and the broadening of the meaning of “aggravated felony,” which authorizes both mandatory 
detention and deportation.  Miller, New Penology, supra note 1, at 651. 
275 See Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 271. 
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possession causes.276  Board decisions interpreting financial crimes as PSCs also have made 
generalizations about the societal harms of such crimes.277  
Unfortunately, because the Refugee Act was passed in 1980, at the dawn of the severity 
revolution, its humanitarian aspects could not override the “tough on crime” mentality of the 
severity revolution.278  Thus we see, in the interpretation of this act, the severity revolution 
playing out in individual decisions about which persons are eligible for withholding.  As part of 
this trend, we see the Board and Attorney General losing all faith in criminal judges to help 
determine, for purposes of PSC determinations, who is a danger to the community.  We also see 
the Board and Attorney General making broad generalizations about classes of offenders as a 
way to minimize the risk presented by certain societal scapegoats. 
 
b. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 as a Case Study 
 
The Bail Reform Act (“BRA”) of 1984,279 part of the part of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984,280 provides a useful case study in a law that was passed at the height of the 
severity revolution and discusses the meaning of danger to the community.281  The 1984 BRA 
was enacted to respond to society’s growing concern for the possibility of crimes being 
committed by defendants awaiting trial for both capital and noncapital offenses.282  Maintaining 
                                                            
276 See R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 660. 
277 In one of the author’s cases, a client with an identity theft conviction was found to have been convicted of a PSC; 
the Board supported its holding by stating, “[i]dentity theft is a serious problem in our society.”  In re L-V-R- (Nov. 
17, 2014). 
278 For a discussion of the “compassion fatigue” that saw the transformation from a generous policy toward refugees 
to a growing sense that the U.S. could not control its borders, see Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 1, at 
624-29. 
279 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 USCA §§ 3141-50 (1984).   
280 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3141-3151). 
281 Although there are other examples where dangerousness is assessed by judges, this article uses federal bail law as 
the most instructive example of dangerousness determinations for the PSC context because of its central legislative 
goal of protecting the public, which closely tracks the goals of the PSC bar.  For example, civil commitment statutes 
and sexually violent predator statutes have the partial goal of treating the offender and protecting the offender 
himself.  See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (reasoning that the state has a legitimate interest under 
its parens patriae authority to treat the mentally ill and under its police power to protect the community “from the 
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill”).  Statutes governing juvenile detention have been justified as a 
shift in custody from the child’s parent to the state.  See, e.g., Schall, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“[J]uveniles, unlike 
adults, are always in some form of custody”).  Statutes governing sentencing in general have goals of providing 
correctional treatment to the defendant and signaling to the public the seriousness of a defendant’s crime in addition 
to protecting the public from future crime.  See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 7.01(1) (recommending that a court 
should not sentence a convicted defendant to imprisonment unless there is undue risk that during the period of a 
suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime; the defendant is in need of correctional 
treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or a lesser sentence will 
depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime).  Statutes governing the death sentence, because they are 
sentencing statutes, have a combined goal of signaling to the public of the seriousness of the crime.  See id.; see also 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 883 n.1 (1983) (quoting TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 37.071) (death penalty 
permitted if there is a probability that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society).  Statutes governing parole have a combined legislative purpose of preventing 
dangerous persons from being free in society and allowing those who are not dangerous a period of successful 
integration into society through a period of controlled release.  See Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal 
Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702, 702 (1963).     
282 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50; S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3188 (“BRA Senate Report”) (stating that the 1966 Bail Reform Act “has come under 
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a presumption for pretrial release, the 1984 BRA mandates that the Government prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonably ensure the safety of the 
community.283 Congress included the consideration of dangerousness, however, as a strict 
exception to the presumption of pretrial release.284    
 The 1984 BRA created a procedure whereby prosecutors can ask for detention hearings 
when the case involved certain crimes, such as drug trafficking and crimes of violence, that 
indicated a defendant’s dangerousness.285  The 1984 BRA also created rebuttable presumptions 
of dangerousness when defendants are charged with certain enumerated crimes,286 effectively 
shifting the burden of persuasion from the government to the defendant.287  The judicial officer 
presumes, in these cases, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 
the appearance of the defendant at trial or safety of the community if there is probable cause to 
believe that the defendant committed certain enumerated offenses. 288  The rebuttable 
presumptions have been amended over the years to include several offenses; today, offenses 
involving drug trafficking, terrorism, carrying a firearm in the commission of a crime of 
violence, and offenses involving minor victims (from sexual abuse to offenses involving child 
pornography) all create the rebuttable presumption of dangerousness.289 
What lessons can one draw from the 1984 BRA to import into PSC law?  First, the 
evolution of which categories of crimes evince “dangerousness” in the BRA parallels this 
evolution in PSC determinations.  The BRA’s signature component, the authorization of pretrial 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
criticism as too liberally allowing release and as providing too little flexibility to judges in making appropriate 
release decisions regarding defendants who pose a danger to the community…In the Committee’s view, it is 
intolerable that the law denies judges the tools to make honest and appropriate decisions regarding the release of 
[dangerous] defendants”).   
283 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-42.  To determine whether or not a particular defendant is dangerous to the community, a 
judicial officer shall consider: (1) the circumstances of the charged offense; (2) the amount of evidence against the 
defendant; (3) the history and character of the defendant; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to another 
person or the community.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 
284 The constitutionality of the BRA of 1984 was upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1987 case U.S. v. Salerno.  
481 U.S. 739 (1987).  The Court held that the government’s regulatory interests, preventing crime by the arrestee, 
was both a legitimate and compelling governmental interest, and that the statute only permitted detention in 
carefully limited circumstances involving the most serious of crimes.  See id. at 747-49.  Also, the Court was 
satisfied that there were sufficient procedural protections in place during such a detention hearing and that the 
duration of confinement was limited by the “stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.”  Id. at 747, 751.   
285 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); BRA Senate Report, supra note 282, at 3200-05.   
286 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). 
287 See United States v. Perez-Franco, 839 F.2d 867, 870 (1st Cir. 1988). 
288 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). 
289 The statute creates a presumption of dangerousness if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant 
committed: (1) an offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is mandated by the 
Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act; (2) an offense under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
924(c) (person who during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime uses or carries a 
firearm), 956(a) (person who conspires to murder, kidnap, or maim), or 2332b (person who commits acts of 
terrorism transcending national boundaries) of this title; (3) an offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (person 
who commits federal crime of terrorism) for which a maximum term of ten years is prescribed; (4) an offense under 
chapter 77 for which a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years or more is prescribed (peonage, slavery and 
human trafficking); or (5) an offense involving a minor victim (like kidnapping, sex trafficking, sexual abuse, 
offenses resulting in death, sexual exploitation, selling or buying of children, child pornography, or transportation of 
minors).  See id. 
32 
 
detention due to dangerousness,290 was modeled after the District of Columbia Court Reform and 
Criminal Procedures Act of 1970.291  In the DC statute, Congress only permitted pretrial 
detention if the prosecutor proves by a substantial probability that the defendant committed a 
crime of violence292 or a “dangerous crime.”293  “Dangerous crime” was defined by reference to 
violent crimes: theft by force, burglary of a dwelling, arson, rape or assault with intent to commit 
rape.294 “Dangerous crime,” however, also included drug trafficking.295  Similarly, in the 1984 
BRA, Congress deemed drug traffickers a danger to the community by describing dangerousness 
by the term “safety to any other person or the community;”296 the Senate Report stated, “[t]he 
committee intends that the concern about safety be given a broader construction than merely 
danger of harm involving physical violence….[t]he committee also emphasizes that the risk that 
a defendant will continue to engage in drug trafficking constitutes a danger to the ‘safety of any 
other person or the community.’”297  The DC model tracks the early days of which crimes were 
labeled PSCs; in those days, only violent crimes and drug trafficking convictions were PSCs.  
The 1984 BRA kept drug trafficking as a proxy for dangerousness; the drafters intended to track 
the DC statute’s dangerousness definitions.298  In 2003, however, Congress expanded the 
presumption of dangerousness in federal bail determinations to include other non-violent 
offenses such as possession of child pornography.299  Similarly, the Attorney General in 2002 
                                                            
290 See BRA Senate Report, supra note 282, at 3201 (discussing how 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e) and (f) “create new 
authority to deny release to those defendants who are likely to engage in conduct endangering the safety of the 
community even if released pending trial only under the most stringent of the conditions listed in section 3142(c)”). 
291 See id. at 3205.  Scholars disputed how closely the BRA tracked the DC statute because the BRA had fewer 
procedural protections.  Miller and Guggenheim, supra note 264, at 347. 
292 Section 1331(4) defined “crime of violence” as: 
murder, forcible rape, carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen, taking or attempting to take immoral, 
improper, or indecent liberties with a child under the age of sixteen years, mayhem, kidnaping, robbery, burglary, 
voluntary manslaughter, extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, arson, assault with intent to 
commit any offense, assault with a dangerous weapon, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
offenses as defined by any Act of Congress or any State law, if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more 
than one year.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1331(4) (1989). 
293 See id. § 23-1322(a)(2). 
294 A “dangerous crime” included: 
(A) taking or attempting to take property from another by force or threat of force, (B) unlawfully entering or 
attempting to enter any premises adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business with 
the intent to commit an offense therein, (C) arson or attempted arson of any premises adaptable for overnight 
accommodation of persons or for carrying on business, (D) forcible rape, or assault with intent to commit forcible 
rape, or (E) unlawful sale or distribution of a narcotic or depressant or stimulant drug (as defined by any Act of 
Congress) if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.  See id. § 23-1331(3). 
295 See id. 
296 BRA Senate Report, supra note 282, at 3195. 
297 Id.; see also Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of Core 
Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 121, 143 (2009) (“[T]he BRA does 
not define danger; the legislative history does suggest, however, that Congress considers drug trafficking dangerous 
to communities.”). 
298 See BRA Senate Report, supra note 280, at 3203-04. 
299 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act) 
§ 203, Pub. L. 108–21, 117 Stat 650 (2003) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) to include several offenses involving 
minor offenses, including kidnapping, production or possession of child pornography, and transporting children for 
the purposes of child prostitution). 
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decided that drug trafficking was presumptively a PSC, building on earlier Board decisions,300 
and the Board in 2012 decided that possession of child pornography was a PSC.301 
Second, that financial crimes and most other non-violent offenses do not create a 
presumption of dangerousness under the BRA or authorize pretrial detention based on 
dangerousness should be significantly instructive in the PSC context.302  As noted, the Board and 
AG may be subtly tracking the BRA’s dangerousness presumptions in its published decisions.  
The only non-violent offenses found to be PSCs in published decisions concerned drug 
trafficking and possession of child pornography, offenses which would create a presumption of 
dangerousness under the BRA (although neither the Board nor AG referenced the BRA in those 
decisions).303  However, financial crimes create no presumption of dangerousness under the 
BRA.304  Therefore, if the Board or Attorney General were to use the BRA’s dangerousness 
presumptions as an analogy for which classes of offenders are a danger to the community, 
financial crimes do not fit.   
 
c. Lessons Learned from the Severity Revolution 
 
There has been significant scholarly critique of the draconian crime prevention measures 
passed during the 1980’s and 90’s305  and the BRA in particular.306  The references to drug 
                                                            
300 See Part IIc. 
301 See R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 660. 
302 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), (f).  Several circuit courts have held that pretrial detention for dangerousness is only 
authorized when the case involves one of the enumerated crimes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) or (f) or if, 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B), there is a serious risk that the defendant will obstruct justice or threaten, 
injury, or intimidate a prospective witness or juror.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Bryd, 969 F.2d 106, 109-110 (5th Cir. 1992); 
U.S. v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that pretrial detention hearing for dangerousness is only 
authorized); U.S. v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 157-58 (3d. Cir. 1986) (“The district court ordered that the defendant be 
detained prior to trial because of the danger of the defendant’s recidivism in crimes involving the use of fraudulent 
identification.  We hold that this is not the type of danger to the community which will support an order of detention 
under the Bail Reform Act of 1984.”). 
303 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (3)(E) (presumption of dangerousness in pre-trial detention hearing if there is 
probable cause to believe the defendant committed one of a number of offenses against minor victims, one of which 
is 18 U.S.C. § 2252, which punishes in part receipt of child pornography in interstate commerce) with R-A-M-, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. at 660 (holding that possession of child pornography is a PSC); also compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A) 
(presumption of dangerousness in pre-trial detention hearing if there is probable cause to believe the defendant 
committed a drug trafficking offenses) with Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 274 (holding that drug trafficking convictions 
are presumptively PSCs). 
304 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).  For the purposes of a bail hearing pending sentencing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 3143, 
which does not limit the categories of crimes that create a presumption of dangerousness, courts have found that the 
likelihood to commit financial crimes can demonstrate danger to the community.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Reynolds, 956 
F.2d 192, 192-93 (9th Cir. 1992); see also U.S. v. Madoff, 316 Fed. Appx. 58, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2009) (unpublished) 
(reasoning, in dicta, that defendant convicted of non-violent offenses can still be a danger to the community for 
purposes of bail determination on appeal).  In U.S. v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit 
interpreted a prior version of BRA, which authorized detention based on dangerousness when considering bail for a 
defendant on appeal but, unlike the 1984 BRA, set forth no statutory presumptions of dangerousness.  Id. at 90.  
Although the defendants had been convicted of federal racketeering, which involved no physical harm to any 
person, the court held that “a defendant’s propensity to commit crime generally, even if the resulting harm would be 
not solely physical, may constitute a sufficient risk of danger to come within the contemplation of the Act”).  Id. at 
95.  The drafters of the 1984 BRA cited to Provenzano to justify the idea that “danger to the community” can be 
extended to nonphysical harms.  See BRA Senate Report, supra note 282, at 3195. 
305 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 264, at (“The criminal justice system has run off the rails…no stable regulating 
mechanism governs the frequency or harshness of criminal punishment, which has swung wildly from excessive 
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trafficking as a proxy for dangerousness, thus meriting long prison sentences, is part of the 
severity revolution, the context in which the “war on drugs” took place.307  The severity 
revolution, however, has failed.308  Many believe that we lost the war on drugs.309  Thus it is 
untenable to cling to such proxies for dangerousness, especially when refugee protection is at 
issue.  For this reason, this article does not argue that PSC decisions should perfectly track the 
BRA dangerousness presumption categories.  Rather, the meaning of “dangerousness” in PSC 
determinations should be interpreted more narrowly than the those in federal bail law, since a 
person’s life is at stake, and a PSC finding means that a noncitizen may not even present the 
facts of persecution to an immigration judge.310  When interpreting the Refugee Convention, the 
trend should be heading in the opposite direction than the criminal justice system’s severity 
revolution.  Withholding claims should be focused on the individualized person and the risk she 
presents to the U.S. community.  The “tough on crime” mentality of the severity revolution311 
should not stand in the way of U.S. treaty obligations to protect refugees. 
One can argue that the lessons learned from the war on drugs do not apply in the PSC 
context.  The war on drugs failed, many say, because it caused more harm – namely, the harm to 
black communities because of the long sentences doled out primarily to young black men for 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
lenity to excessive severity.”); Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime 3-4 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (citing 
Doris Lessing, The Four-Gated City (1969)) (“Americans have built a new civil and political order structured around 
the problem of violent crime…Though Lessing condemned this new order as an ‘organized barbarism,’ many 
Americans have come to tolerate it as a necessary response to unacceptable risks of violence in everyday life.”); 
David Garland, The Culture of Control 3, 8-20 (Univ. Chicago Press 2001) (describing twelve indices of change in 
the U.S. and British criminal justice systems from 1970-2000 and stating, “[t]he last three decades have seen an 
accelerating movement away from the assumptions that shaped crime control and criminal justice for most of the 
twentieth century”); Simon, supra note 7, at 221 (considering different theories behind the “severity revolution”); 
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 833 (“We have developed a draconian system of punishment for dealing with monsters 
that we have imagined being everywhere, a system that swallows up hordes of lesser offenders.”). 
306 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 723 (2011) (arguing that 
the BRA violates the due process concept of the presumption of innocence); Wiseman, supra note 297, at 155-56 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)) (arguing that the BRA’s allowance for judges to consider “character, physical and 
mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community 
ties, past conduct, [and] history relating to drug or alcohol abuse,” along with their “history and characteristics” 
when deciding whether to grant a bail violates the anti-discrimination principles of the Eighth Amendment); see also 
Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventative Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 
376-77 (1970) (critiquing preventive detention and the precursor to the BRA of 1984, the District of Columbia Court 
Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970, as the first time a bail judge could consider dangerousness because 
historically, bail law had only allowed judges to consider flight risk); but see Albert Alschuler, Preventive Detention 
and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 548-50 (1986) (disputing 
the historical record that pretrial detention was only based on flight risk and never on dangerousness).   
307 See Simon, supra note 7, at 227. 
308 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 7, at 907 (“We are imprisoning legions of people who do not deserve or need to be 
imprisoned and keeping others incarcerated for far longer than we should.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 264, at 294-
97 (discussing changes that must be made in the law and practice of criminal sentencing, starting with its severity, 
because “America’s inmate population is infamously massive”). 
309 See, e.g., Nekima Levy-Pounds, Going Up in Smoke: The Impacts of the Drug War on Young Black Men, 6 ALB. 
GOV'T L. REV. 563, 564 (2013); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Ending the War on Drugs, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 
xvii (1997); David Schultz, Rethinking Drug Criminalization Policies, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 151 (1993); see also 
Bilz and Darley, supra note 204, at 1244-45 (discussing harms to black communities stemming from the longer 
sentences for crack cocaine than for powder cocaine). 
310 See Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 209. 
311 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 855. 
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drug-related offenses.312  Long sentences are not at issue in the PSC context.  However, the 
harms are similar.  Here, the communities from which immigrants are deported suffer in the loss 
of sister, daughter or mother; in fact, the community suffers even more because deportation is 
permanent.313   Also, communities suffer doubly from the deportation of a refugee because they 
potentially lose the person forever if she is killed upon deportation as she fears.  At a minimum, 
communities here suffer because they live with the anxiety that their sister/ daughter/ mother is 
going to be in harm’s way in the country of deportation.  Moreover, the goal of the PSC bar – 
protecting the U.S. community314 – arguably is not served by deporting a drug trafficker.  Unlike 
the noncitizen who may commit future violent crimes, someone who is likely to commit drug 
trafficking in the future still could engage in such activity from abroad, thus equally harming the 
U.S. community.  As Attorney General Ashcroft noted, “international terrorists increasingly 
employ drug trafficking as one of their primary sources of funding.”315   Of course the low-level 
offenders (those who sell small amounts of drugs to finance their own habits) may be less 
inclined to engage in international drug trafficking, but some have questioned whether these 
people even should be included when we discuss the dangers presented by drug traffickers.316 
 
 
V. Proposal: Violent Crimes With Significant Prison Time as Particularly Serious Crimes 
 
This article proposes that Congress redefine PSC to include only violent offenses against 
persons where the noncitizen served a significant sentence; alternatively, the Board or Attorney 
General could adopt such a test for cases falling within their discretion.   
Why draw the line at violent offenses?  First, the inviolability of the body is a central 
concept of criminal law.317  As Alice Ristroph has written, “[t]he possibility of violent crime is a 
central source of legitimation for the criminal justice system.  We humans are physically 
vulnerable creatures, and we expect law to provide a measure of protection.”318  To support her 
argument, Ristroph cites HLA Hart, who characterized efforts to protect vulnerable human 
bodies from physical injury as the “minimum content” of a legal system,319 and Thomas Hobbes, 
who identified fear of violent death as so central to human psychology that it is the driving force 
behind the creation of political societies.320  Because the PSC bar stems from a desire to the 
protect the public from dangerous individuals, which is the central goal of criminal law, the 
                                                            
312 See Levy-Pounds, supra note 307, at 564; Bilz and Darley, supra note 204, at 1244-45; Harcourt, supra note 204, 
at 173-76 (discussing the competing harm arguments that proponents and opponents of the war on drugs have used). 
313 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (barring from admission any noncitizen who has previously been removed if 
convicted of an aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (categorizing drug trafficking as an aggravated 
felony). 
314 See N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 341. 
315 Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276. 
316 See Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1990) (questioning harsh punishment for peripheral actors in the drug trade like drug mules and 
street salesmen, which the author, a U.S. district court judge, describes as “lower echelon offenders”). 
317 See Ristroph, supra note 81, at 612 (“The primary reason to have criminal laws, police forces, and prisons is to 
address the problem of violent crime.  The system’s central purpose, in the public understanding, is not to enforce 
morality or even to deter purely self-regarding harmful behavior such as drug use.  The system exists to protect 
public safety.”). 
318 Id. at 611. 
319 Id. at 612 (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 189 (1961)).  
320 Id. at 611 (citing Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, George Routledge and Sons, ed ed. 1886). 
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inviolability of the body at the heart of criminal law should be the same in PSC law.321  Second, 
deporting the violent offender actually protects the U.S. community from a dangerous individual, 
since that person will physically be unable to commit a violent crime against a person from 
abroad.  That offender can, however, continue to commit drug trafficking, financial crimes, or 
possession of child pornography from afar, so the U.S. community is not as protected when we 
deport this type of offender.322   
Why implement a significant sentence requirement?  This is one way of reversing the 
trend of mistrusting criminal judges that is seen in both PSC determinations and immigration law 
in general.  That a criminal court judge actually required the convicted person to spend some 
time in prison is highly instructive of the person’s dangerousness.  If a criminal judge decided 
this person should go free, the immigration system should trust that judge.  Of course, in many 
cases, criminal judges’ hands are tied by mandatory minimum sentences.  However, the Supreme 
Court and Congress have chipped away at certain aspects of the severity revolution’s harsh 
sentencing policies.323 As the critics of mandatory minimums gain more traction,324 PSC 
determinations will feel the impact.     
What is a “significant” sentence?  One possible bright-line rule is that the noncitizen 
actually have served five years in prison.  This five-year cutoff is contained in the current PSC 
statutory language, as Congress intended for aggravated felonies with five-year sentences to be 
PSCs.  Additionally, this cutoff has precedent in immigration law, as it tracks the old law of the 
212(c) waiver.325  The 212(c) waiver, which no longer exists in immigration law, was previously 
available to long-term permanent residents who could show that their equities outweighed the 
negative factors in their life such as a criminal record.326  It was only available, however, to those 
who had served less than five years for an aggravated felony conviction.327  This provides an 
example of deferring to criminal sentencing judges that hardly exists in immigration law; it 
would be a good idea to bring back this piece of 212(c) law into PSC determinations.   
What, then, of others’ proposals to correct the PSC test?  Others have argued for a 
balancing test; this article will not recreate that debate.328  The Supreme Court, however, has 
                                                            
321 See id.; see also Part Ib. 
322 See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text. 
323 See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat 2372 (2010) (eliminating sentencing disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine); U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233-37 (2005) (holding that that the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, when instructing judges to make factual findings to calculate increases in applicable 
sentencing ranges, violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury). 
324 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 264, at 295-96 (describing the effect of Booker as making the sentencing guidelines 
“ceilings rather than rules,” which restored discretion to federal sentencing, and arguing that this “state of affairs 
offers a useful model for a kind of sentencing law that might push prison populations down rather than up”); David 
Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn from the Failures of Sentencing Reforms, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 
577, 583-84 (1996) (“[T]here is near unanimity among commentators, judges, and even the United States 
Sentencing Commission that mandatory minimums are failures, imposing unduly harsh sentences in many cases and 
inviting evasion and manipulation.”). 
325 See former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).  While the 212(c) waiver originally was available to any long-term lawful 
permanent resident who had an aggravated felony conviction, the Immigration Act of 1990 barred 212(c) relief from 
residents who served more than five years for an aggravated felony.  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 
104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
326 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 295-97; Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978). 
327 See former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1990). 
328 See Delgado, supra note 4, at 18; cf. Nadia Yakoob, Political Offender or Serious Criminal? Challenging the 
Interpretation of ‘Serious, Nonpolitical Crimes' in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 545, 564-65 
(2000); Goodwin-Gill, supra note 12, at 106 (“In practice, the claim to be a refugee can rarely be ignored, for a 
37 
 
disagreed, as has the Board.329  In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court held that when interpreting the 
serious nonpolitical crime bar to withholding, there should be no balancing of the risk of 
persecution against the seriousness of the harm.  Although that was not a PSC case, the Court 
upheld the Board’s decision in Rodriguez-Coto that in deciding whether an offense is either a 
serious nonpolitical crimes or a PSC, there should be no balancing of the risk of persecution 
against the seriousness of the crime.330  Proponents of the balancing test present strong moral 
arguments, although “even its strongest proponents do not claim that the balancing test is a 
mandatory requirement of law;” rather, the balancing test is less controversial if seen as a 
“humanitarian cross-check.”331  In fact, there may be some unofficial humanitarian cross-
checking going on behind the scenes of an immigration judge’s decision when deciding PSC.332  
Some also have argued for a separate determination of dangerousness,333 calling on the 
Board to overrule its decision in Carballe.334  An early critic of this separate determination of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
balance must also be struck between the nature of the offence presumed to have been committed and the degree of 
persecution feared.”); 1 Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law 297-98 (1996); Weis, 
supra note 31, at 342 (“The principle of proportionality has to be observed, that is, in the words of the UK 
representative at the Conference, whether the danger entailed to the refugee by expulsion or return outweighs the 
menace to public security that would arise if he were permitted to stay.”). 
329 See Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 209; cf. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 426 (upholding the Board’s 
decision in Rodriguez-Coto that for a serious nonpolitical crime determination, it is not necessary to weigh the risk 
of persecution).   
330 See Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 209. 
331 Michael Kingsley Nyinah, Exclusion under Article 1F: Some Reflections on Context, Principles and Practice, 12 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 307 (2000, special supplementary issue); see also id. (raising questions as to whether there can 
truly be “degrees of persecution” and why two refugees who committed the same offense can be treated differently, 
for the purposes of the serious nonpolitical crime exception, if one suffered more persecution than the other). 
332 In an example from the author’s practice, one client presented significant evidence of the likelihood of his 
persecution, yet had several assault with a dangerous weapon offenses, which under the Board’s earliest case law 
would likely be a PSC.  See, e.g., B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 429 (holding that aggravated battery involving a firearm 
was a PSC).  However, neither the Department of Homeland Security trial attorney nor the immigration judge raised 
the issue, even though the PSC issue was argued and briefed for the case.  The client was granted withholding of 
removal.  See also Matter of L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 653 (“A determination that a crime is ‘particularly serious’ 
cannot…be made in a vacuum.  It must take into account that an alien convicted of such a crime, and therefore 
excluded from applying for relief under section 241(b)(3), could be an alien who would otherwise meet the burden 
of proof for this relief and thus would be subject to persecution when removed from the United States.”). 
333 The separate determination of dangerousness finds support from international refugee law experts and other 
countries’ interpretations of the Refugee Convention.  See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under 
International Law 344 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (“Beyond [a PSC determination], there must also be a 
determination that the offender constitutes a danger to the community.”); Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 38, 
at 140 ¶191 (“An additional assessment is called for which will hinge on an appreciation of issues of fact such as the 
nature and circumstances of the particularly serious crime for which the individual was convicted, when the crime in 
question was committed, evidence of recidivism or likely recidivism, etc.”); see also EN (Serbia) v. Secretary of the 
Home Department (2010) Q.B. 633 (U.K.) (United Kingdom Queen’s Bench ruling that “Article 33(2) of the 
Refugee Convention imposes on a state wishing [to expel a refugee] both the requirement that the person have been 
convicted by final judgment of a [PSC] and the requirement that he constitute a danger to the community.”); 
Pushpanathan v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [1988] 1 S.C.R. 982, ¶12 (Canadian Supreme Court ruling 
that, when interpreting the Refugee Convention’s PSC determination, the government must “make the added 
determination that the person poses a danger to the safety of the public or security of the country…to justify 
refoulement.”); In re Tamayo & Dep’t of Immigration (1994), 37 A.L.D. 786, ¶20 (Australian Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal ruling that “the reference in Article 33(2) of the convention to a refugee who ‘constitutes a danger 
to the community’ is….concerned with the risk of recidivism,” so a refugee’s personal circumstances must be 
considered insofar “as they affect the possibility of recidivism and the danger to the community”). 
334 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 4; McGarry, supra note 4. 
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dangerousness, Judge Vance of the Eleventh Circuit, discussed the administrative difficulties of 
such a separate determination of dangerousness, stating that it “would require a prediction as to 
the alien’s potential for recidivism and would lead to extensive, drawn-out hearings complete 
with psychological evaluations and expert testimony.”335   In other areas of law where 
predictions of dangerousness must be made,336 psychiatrists and other mental health 
professionals have argued how unpredictable these are, making the point that “the prediction of 
dangerous behavior is an ‘empirical quicksand’ and that psychology and psychiatry should get 
clear of it as expeditiously as possible.”337   The Supreme Court, however, has held that such 
psychological predictions about dangerousness can be made in death penalty cases (although 
Justice Blackmun strongly disagreed).338   The separate determination of dangerousness can be 
made in immigration law – in fact it is made on a daily basis in bond hearings, as the judge must 
consider first and foremost whether the noncitizen is a danger to persons or property.339   
Given the steep uphill battle of overruling the Supreme Court, Board, and every circuit 
court, this article posits that we do not need to go so far.  Even without a balancing test or 
separate determination of dangerousness, the problems highlighted in this article can be 
corrected if PSC is narrowly limited to violent offenses where the offender served significant 
prison time.  The solution proposed in this article would allow the immigration judge to focus 
exclusively on dangerousness, as opposed to requiring a balancing test.  The solution also would 
allow the immigration judge to focus on the nature and circumstances of the crime in question as 
opposed to trying to predict future dangerousness.  However, the solution would largely place the 
decision of who is dangerous with two important players: the criminal judge and criminal law.  
The proposal relies on criminal judges, by trusting them to sort out the dangerous criminals for 
the most prison time, and criminal law, by using violence – “the old-fashioned, physically 
harmful kind” – as a proxy for dangerousness.340  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
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“[T]he line must be drawn so that ‘particularly serious crimes’ are not a major proportion 
of crimes generally.”341  The Ninth Circuit’s relatively recent words of wisdom provide a 
refreshing change from the PSC law trends of the past decade and a half, which have led many 
refugees to be deported without any consideration of their fear of persecution.  This article has 
sought to explain why PSC has broadened beyond recognition by using the term’s expansion as 
an example of both the mistrust of criminal judges and sweeping effect in immigration law, two 
trends that mirror aspects of criminal law’s severity revolution.  It is time for Congress, the 
Board, or Attorney General to reverse the trends in PSC law that have allowed non-violent 
crimes to be PSCs.  This will allow immigration judges to see refugees for what they are: 
individuals in need of protection, not dangerous criminals in need of deportation. 
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